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UN-REPEAL: REVIVING THE ARMS CONTROL
IMPACT STATEMENTS
David A. Koplow∗
From the late 1970s into the early 1990s, U.S. federal law mandated the executive
branch to prepare annual analytical documents known as Arms Control Impact Statements
(ACIS). These instruments – obviously patterned after the Environmental Impact
Statements (EIS), which had been inaugurated only a few years previously – were intended
to prod the national security community to undertake more rigorous, multi-dimensional study
of major weapons programs, and to provide Congress and the American public with enhanced,
timely information about key arms procurement decisions.
However, unlike the EIS process – which rapidly became institutionalized, and
which has proliferated to multiple tiers of government and around the world over the past
fifty years – the ACIS process was a conspicuous failure. It was widely regarded as a
meaningless exercise, consuming immense bureaucratic resources and hardly ever changing
any outcomes – a colossal waste of time. The statute that created the ACIS operation was
amended to abolish the entire program after only a decade and half of fitful operation.
This Article undertakes to compare the starkly different case histories of the ACIS
and EIS programs, with an eye to revival of the former in an appropriately modified form.
It analyzes the goals of the legislation and the key features accounting for success and failure,
and makes recommendations for a modern revival of ACIS that are based upon lessons
learned in other contexts. The proposal seeks to underscore the concept that arms control is a
key element in sound national security policy, to promote more systematic, wide-ranging
analysis in support of key national decision-making, and to empower the legislative branch,
as well as the public, to participate in policy debates in a more informed, timely manner.
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INTRODUCTION
From the late 1970s into the early 1990s, U.S. federal law mandated the
executive branch to prepare annual analytical documents known as Arms Control
Impact Statements (ACIS). These instruments – obviously patterned after the
Environmental Impact Statements (EIS), which had been inaugurated via other
legislation only a few years previously – were intended to prod the national security
community to undertake more rigorous, multi-dimensional study of major pending
weapons programs, and to provide Congress and the American public with enhanced,
timely information about key arms procurement decisions.
However, unlike the EIS process – which rapidly became institutionalized,
and which has proliferated to multiple tiers of government and around the world
over the past fifty years – the ACIS process was a conspicuous failure. It was widely
regarded as a meaningless exercise, generating intense interagency wrangling,
consuming immense bureaucratic resources, and hardly ever changing any outcomes
– a colossal waste of time. The statute that created the ACIS operation was amended
to abolish the entire program after only a decade and half of fitful operation.
What accounts for the stark differences between the fates of these two
facially similar impact assessment programs? Why has the environmental analysis
become a standard, well-accepted part of the U.S. legal and cultural landscape,
despite the inherent costs and delays it imposes, while the comparable process for
organized scrutiny of weapons decisions foundered? What factors explain the success
of the EIS as a fixture in American jurisprudence and the corresponding collapse of
the ACIS as an American artifact? In particular, is there scope for a revival of the
program of mandatory systematic governmental study and public explanation of
major weapons programs, borrowing and suitably adapting some of the lessons from
the previous failure, as well as from the modern world of environmental law?
This Article undertakes to compare the case histories of ACIS and EIS, and
then sets out how the former might be reinstated in a modified form. First, Section
I presents the saga of the late, largely unlamented arms control impact statute, which
was in force from 1976 through 1993, generating eighteen iterations of uneven studies
submitted to Congress. This section identifies the original goals of the legislation’s
key sponsors, explains what the law required, and describes how the executive branch
half-heartedly responded. It analyzes the limited efficacy of the annual documents;
the ACIS process generated plenty of interagency controversy and copious
bureaucratic churning, but little overall programmatic effect, because the resulting
instruments were too often brief, conclusory, and repetitive. Finally, this section
describes how the statutory obligation to prepare ACIS was repealed, tearing down
what had simply become a Potemkin Village of boilerplate description, instead of
deep analysis.
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Section II turns to the case study of environmental law, presenting the 1969
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)1 and its progeny, which established the
EIS process. Importantly, environmental assessment is a “procedural” obligation in
that it requires punctilious, all-azimuth analysis of a proposed major federal action,
its environmental consequences, and its alternatives. But NEPA does not by itself
establish substantive standards or restrictions on emissions, land uses, hazardous
waste management, or the preservation of species. Notably, the NEPA framework
applies even to national security-related programs, and an accompanying executive
order extends comparable coverage to certain U.S.-based actions that have
environmental effects abroad. Importantly, NEPA has triggered an avalanche of
litigation, especially by generating resistance from sponsors of programs that were
hindered or made more expensive. Nevertheless, the process of detailed, laborious
environmental evaluation has been woven into U.S. popular and business culture, as
a grudgingly accepted, but now irresistible burden.
For further comparison, Section III briefly considers some other types of
“impact assessment” programs that currently exist in U.S. and international law and
practice (even if they are not always labeled as such). Comparing the trajectories of
these diverse copycat arrangements can help shed light on the prospects for an ACIS
renaissance.
Section IV presents the heart of the matter: a proposal for a modern version
of the ACIS mechanism, with a few new twists intended to incorporate the lessons
of environmental and other practice areas to the special problem of national security.
This section advocates for the advantages of rigorous analysis and public disclosure
of new and evolving weapons and associated programs, and describes the critical
social, political, military, and economic values that such a revived process would
promote. This section is organized around a series of policy and strategy questions
that would have to be resolved in the construction of a new program for this highly
structured arms control analysis. These questions include asking what sorts of
national security activities should be subject to these investigations, when in their
development cycles these analyses should be conducted, who would participate in the
drafting and revision of the statements, and whether judicial review should be
allowed to test in court the adequacy of the proffered documentation.
Section V provides a glimpse of the possible practical application of the
Article’s recommendations, projecting how a newly revised ACIS obligation might
function with respect to current and emerging issues. More specifically, this section
will examine new proposals for the development and fielding of lethal autonomous
weapon systems, anti-satellite weapons, or anti-personnel land mines. It also
describes the hypothetical operation of the new ACIS proposal for some conspicuous
national security programs that do not directly involve U.S. weapons procurements.
These include a new nuclear agreement with Iran, the adoption of advanced cyber

1.
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370m).
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active defense maneuvers, and recent diplomacy dealing with the international trade
in conventional arms.
Finally, the conclusion offers some closing thoughts, including the obvious
point that this topic is more complicated than simply seeking to “apply the NEPA
process to arms control.” The two sets of circumstances are so different that the
goals, procedures, and tactics that inspire success in one venue will not all directly
convey into a distinct universe. But even if there are no automatic solutions, there
is much to learn from environmental law that can undergird the reestablishment of a
viable and lasting procedure for meaningful arms control impact analysis.

I. THE ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS
In 1975, Congress expanded the 1961 Arms Control and Disarmament Act2
– which had earlier established the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA)3 – by grafting on a new section 36, to institute a novel mechanism for
enhanced analysis of major new weapons programs.4 Under this innovative
provision, the executive branch, led by ACDA, was mandated to prepare “a complete
statement analyzing the impact of [proposed major weapons programs] on arms
control and disarmament policy and negotiations.”5
2.

Pub. L. No. 87-297, 75 Stat. 631 (1961) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2551- 2591).

3.
ACDA was a small, specially focused agency, housed inside the Department of State’s
headquarters building, and while generally closely aligned with State, still legally independent. It was
statutorily authorized to serve as the government’s lead agency for developing and executing policy
regarding arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation; for conducting international negotiations in
those fields; and for implementing procedures for verification of compliance with the resulting
international agreements. Id. § 2; see DUNCAN L. CLARKE, POLITICS OF ARMS CONTROL: THE ROLE
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY (1979); Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, hearings before Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. Policy and Sci. Devs. of the
H. Comm. on Foreign Affs., 93d Cong., 2d sess. 183-231 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Hearings] (reprinting
staff review of arms control legislation and organization, assessing the origins and then-current status of
ACDA and the extent to which it had achieved the stature and pursued the goals that Congress originally
intended).
4.
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-141, § 146, 89 Stat.
756, 758 (1975) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2576 (1982)) [hereinafter sec. 36]. A nearly contemporaneous
companion for sec. 36 was created by the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, which established a requirement
for the executive branch to submit to Congress annual and special arms control impact statements for
contemplated international sales of conventional weapons. An interagency process was established to
prepare these documents, somewhat similar to that described in this Article. See International Security
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729, §§ 25(a)(4),
36(b)(1)(D) (1976); Exec. Order No. 11,958, 3 C.F.R. 79 (1977), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 2751; Clarke,
supra note 3, at 89-94.
5.
Sec. 36, supra note 4, § (b)(2); Clarke, supra note 3, at 190-205; see Betty Goetz Lall, Arms
Control Impact Statements: A New Approach to Slowing the Arms Race?, 6 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 1, 3-4
(July/Aug. 1976) (suggesting that the statutory requirement to focus on a weapon’s consistency with
“policy” could be problematic, because if a particular program is inconsistent with a national policy that
currently stands in favor of pursuing arms control, the political result might be a decision to alter the
policy, rather than to abandon the weapon).
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Congressional sponsors, led by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.)
and Representative Clement J. Zablocki (D-Wisc.),6 anticipated that these Arms
Control Impact Statements would promote three important national security
objectives. The primary legislative purpose was to ensure that the arms control
perspective would be fully integrated into the government’s annual decision-making
about significant new weapons research, development, and deployment. The second
goal was to enhance congressional and public access to crucial current information
and analysis about these important defense developments and their policy
ramifications. Third, sponsors wanted to upgrade the role of ACDA within the
executive branch, strengthening that small agency in the internecine debates with its
much larger bureaucratic rivals.7 Despite considerable resistance from the executive
branch (expressed by the Departments of Defense and State, as well as by the ACDA
leadership), the new section 36 rapidly worked its way through the congressional
process in the fall of 1975, and was heralded as a major accomplishment.8

6.
Philip M. Boffey, Arms Control: Impact Statements Called a “Farce” and a “Mockery,” 194
SCIENCE 36 (1976) (describing the goals that Sen. Humphrey, Rep. Zablocki, and other congressional
leaders had for the ACIS program, and its inspiration in the environmental impact statement process).
7.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFF., ID-77-41, STATEMENTS THAT ANALYZE EFFECTS OF
PROPOSED PROGRAMS ON ARMS CONTROL NEED IMPROVEMENT 18 (1977) [hereinafter GAO 1977];
Nancy-Ann E. Min, Toward More Intelligent National Security Policy Making: The Case for Reform of Arms
Control Impact Statements, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 174 (1985); Clarke, supra note 3, at 192 (identifying
four goals); 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, at v (House Committee Chair Rep. Clement J. Zablocki expresses
concern that the initial effectiveness of ACDA has been diminished and the agency has gone into eclipse);
AMY WOOLF & JAMES D. WERNER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45306, EVALUATION OF FISCAL YEAR 1979
ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS: TOWARD MORE INFORMED CONGRESSIONAL
PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYMAKING, report for the Subcomm. on Int’l Sec. and
Sci. Affs. of the H. Comm. on Int’l Rels., 95th Cong., 2d sess. 12 (1979) [hereinafter CRS 1979 Analysis]
(discussing ACIS legislation in the context of a wide range of legislation adopted in the mid-1970s to give
Congress a stronger voice in national affairs); Arms Control Implications of Current Nat’l Def. Programs,
hearings before Subcomm. on Arms Control, Oceans, Int’l Operations, and Env’t of S. Foreign Rels.
Comm., 96th Cong., 1st sess. 73 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Hearings] (statement of Paul Walker that one
purpose of ACIS was to transform ACDA from a “David” into a “Goliath”); Philip M. Boffey, Arms
Control Agency: New Law Seeks to End Its Period of “Eclipse,” 190 SCIENCE 1275 (1975); Robert C. Gray, The
Coordination of Arms Control Policy and the Weapons Acquisition Process: The Case of Arms Control Impact
Statements, 2 ARMS CONTROL 218, 218-20 (1981); see also Lall, supra note 5, at 1 (arguing that “the people
responsible for arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations often have not had up-to-date
information about new weapons systems” and the ACIS requirement could help ensure that relevant
information was available in a timely fashion); JAMES E. GOODBY, HOOVER INST., THE US ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY IN 1961-63: A STUDY IN GOVERNANCE (2017),
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/goodby_the_us_arms_control.pdf (discussing
early history of ACDA).
8.
Clarke, supra note 3, at 190-93; Min, supra note 7, at 179-85; The Arms Control Impact Statement
Process, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, July/August 1976, p. 4 (discussing the legislative origins of sec. 36 and
noting that most executive branch agencies had recommended to President Gerald Ford that he veto the
bill); 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, at 39-40 (presenting early draft of the ACIS statutory language), 74-75
(discussing earlier Harrington Amendment concept for what became the ACIS legislation), 102
(comparing the idea of ACIS to EIS), 155 (ACDA director Fred C. Ikle opposes the idea of ACIS); Boffey
1975, supra note 7 (quoting former deputy direct of ACDA as calling the ACIS requirement “the most
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Under this legislation, the new ACIS requirement would apply to:
a) any program for research, development, testing, deployment, or
modernization of U.S. nuclear weapons;
b) any comparable program dealing with non-nuclear weapons, where the
total program cost was estimated to exceed $250 million or where the annual
costs were expected to exceed $50 million; and
c) any other program that the Director of ACDA “believes may have a
significant impact on arms control and disarmament policy or
negotiations.”9

important legislative change in the structure of arms control matters since the passage of [the original arms
control legislation] itself”).
9.

Sec. 36, supra note 4, § (a). The full text of sec. 36 reads:
ARMS CONTROL IMPACT INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS
Sec. 36. (a) In order to assist the Director in the performance of his duties
with respect to arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations, any
Government agency preparing any legislative or budgetary proposal for(1) any program of research, development, testing, engineering, construction,
deployment, or modernization with respect to nuclear armaments, nuclear
implements of war, military facilities or military vehicles designed or intended
primarily
for
the
delivery
of
nuclear
weapons.
(2) any program of research, development, testing, engineering, construction,
deployment, or modernization with respect to armaments, ammunition,
implements
of
war,
or
military
facilities,
having(A) an estimated total program cost in excess of $250,000,000, or
(B) an estimated annual program cost in excess of $50,000,00, or
(3) any other program involving weapons systems or technology which such
Government agency or the Director believes may have a significant impact on arms
control and disarmament policy or negotiations, shall, on a continuing basis,
provide the Director with full and timely access to detailed information, in
accordance with the procedures established pursuant to section 35 of this Act, with
respect to the nature, scope, and purpose of such proposal.
(b) (1) The Director, as he deems appropriate, shall assess and analyze each
program described in subsection (a) with respect to its impact on arms control and
disarmament policy and negotiations, and shall advise and make recommendations,
on the basis of such assessment and analysis, to the National Security Council, the
Office of Management and Budget, and the Government agency proposing such
program.
(2) Any request to the Congress for authorization or appropriations for(A) any program described in subsection (a)(1) or (2), or
(B) any program described in subsection (a) (3) and found by the National Security
Council, on the basis of the advice and recommendations received from the
Director, to have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament policy or
negotiations, shall include a complete statement analyzing the impact of such
program on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations.
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A. Early ACIS Practice
The first ACIS package, covering fiscal year 1977, was delivered to
Congress in August 1976.10 Unfortunately, this scanty inaugural submission
established what was to become an enduring precedent, as the ACISs “were judged
to be too few in number, too sparse in content, and too late to be of any use in
congressional deliberations over the funding of major defense programs.”11 Of the
estimated seventy programs that would be eligible for coverage in an ACIS, only
sixteen were studied and analyzed. And most of those statements were only two
paragraphs long, entirely superficial, and dealing only with the positive aspects of the

(3) Upon the request of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, or
the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives or the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Director shall, after informing the
Secretary of State, advise such committee on the arms control and disarmament
implications of any program with respect to which a statement has been submitted
to
the
Congress
pursuant
to
paragraph
(2).
(c) No court shall have any jurisdiction under any law to compel the performance
of any requirement of this section or to review the adequacy of the performance of
any such requirement on the part of any Government agency (including the
Agency and the Director).
Sec. 36, supra note 4; see also 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, at 166 (statement by Arms Control Association
critiquing the idea that the fundamental trigger for ACIS should be the cost of a program, rather than
other factors that might raise significant arms control implications and suggesting that activities other
than Defense or ERDA weapons programs should be the subject of ACIS, such as arms sales or CIA
activity).
10. 122 Cong. Rec. 30,975-76 (1976) (reprinting the first unclassified eleven ACIS analyses of
Department of Defense programs).
11. GAO 1977, supra note 7, at 3; Boffey 1976, supra note 6; Barry R. Schneider, Stonewalling on
the Arms Control Impact Statements, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, January 1977, p. 5.
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programs.12 Exacerbating the problem, the documents were delivered after Congress
had already completed the FY 1977 budget authorization process.13
The second ACIS submission (for FY 1978) was filed shortly thereafter, on
January 18, 1977;14 it was only an incremental improvement. This package included
twenty-six statements and an accompanying list of seventy-six other programs
meeting the statutory criteria, but which the executive branch determined (without
explanation) had no prima facie arms control impact and were therefore not worthy
of discussing in detail.15 Again, neither the legislative branch nor outside observers
were satisfied with this barebones implementation of the ACIS paradigm.16 The
12. 122 Cong. Rec. 30,975-76 (1976). The eleven ACIS presentations from the Department of
Defense dealt with Trident submarine weapons, air-launched cruise missiles, maneuvering re-entry
vehicles, and other important and complicated programs, but each ACIS described its subject in only one
long paragraph, and then concluded that it was consistent with existing arms control treaties and
negotiations. Key congressional leaders complained they “were frankly appalled at the statements...The
16 statements are not, in any sense, complete. They certainly are not analytical. They dealt only at the
shallowest level with impact on arms control and disarmament negotiations and they do not deal at all
with impact on policy.” Other members of Congress concurred, “The statements provided do not comply
with the law and are unacceptable.” CONG. RSCH. SERV., Clement J. Zablocki, U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on International Relations, Foreword, Congressional Research Service,
Analysis of Arms Control Impact Statements Submitted in Connection with the Fiscal Year 1978 Budget
Request vii (April 1977 [hereinafter CRS 1977 Analysis]; 122 Cong. Rec. September 17, 1976, S 30,972
(comments of Sen. Sparkman, criticizing the ACIS submissions as too late, too brief, and unsubstantial),
30,973-74 (reprinting letter from Congressional Research Service describing what would be required in a
meaningful ACIS).
13. GAO 1977, supra note 7, at 3; Lall, supra note 5, at 2 (quoting Sen. Hubert Humphrey, one of
the key sponsors of the ACIS legislation, complaining that the delayed submission of such a paltry 1976
set of documents would undermine trust between the executive and legislative branches, and “is a violation
of the law.”); Clarke, supra note 3, at 196-97; Robert Lyle Butterworth, The Arms Control Impact Statement:
A Programmatic Assessment, 8 POL’Y STUD. J. no. 1, fall 1979, p. 76, 77 (characterizing Congress as viewing
the first ACIS submission as “insulting,” resulting from executive branch “stonewalling”).
14. Arms Control Impact Analyses for Fiscal Year 1978 submitted January 18, 1977, reprinted in CRS
1977 Analysis, supra note 12, at 378-411.
15. GAO 1977, supra note 7, at 9; Philip M. Boffey, Arms Control Impact Statements Again Have
LittleImpact,196SCIENCE1181(June10,1977),https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.196.4295.11
81; Letter from Charles R. Gellner to S. Foreign Rels. Comm., in CRS 1977 Analysis, supra note 12, at 1,
183-211 (critiquing list of Department of Defense programs for which no ACIS was submitted);
Butterworth, supra note 13, at 78 (saying “the degree of improvement was slight” from the first ACIS
package to the second.)
16.

After evaluating the second set of ACIS submissions, two key senators wrote
[W]e conclude that the latest statements still do not comply with the law and
are unacceptable as a model for future submissions. The submitted statements
are neither complete nor adequately analytical. They do not deal in any
comprehensive way with the impact of the programs covered upon arms control
policy and negotiations. They clearly have not served the purpose envisioned
in the legislation of being an integral part of the decision akin process within
the executive branch, nor could they be of particular value to the Congress in
making its own appraisals and in participating in the formulation of arms
control policy. A further problem with the statements is that of secrecy. When
classification is necessary for full and detailed discussion, as we noted in our
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articulation of more useful documentation in this early phase was stymied by various
ambiguities in the statute and even more by persistent push-back from the
Department of Defense and the Energy Research and Development Administration
(ERDA) (the forerunner of today’s Department of Energy, which was responsible
for much of the research, development, testing and production of nuclear weapons).17

B. Evolving ACIS Practice.
In subsequent presidential administrations, the ACIS process ebbed and
flowed, in parallel with national politics and with the oscillating attitudes of executive
and legislative branch officials regarding overall arms control policy. The mechanism
eventually benefitted from legislative tweaks that attempted to resolve some of the
uncertainties in the original enactment,18 and from the prodding of a helpful
Congressional Research Service “model” of how the documents should be
structured.19
response to the first submissions, specific statements should be provided in
classified and unclassified form. Every effort should be made to provide
unclassified information to the fullest extent possible.
Letter from Sen. John Sparkman, chair of S. Comm. on Foreign Rels., and Clifford P. Case, ranking
member, to Paul C. Warnke, Director of ACDA (March 25, 1977), reprinted in CRS 1977 Analysis, at iv,
v; Boffey 1977, supra note 15; Letter from Charles R. Gellner to S. Foreign Rels. Comm., in CRS 1977
Analysis, supra note 12, at 1, 29-34 (discussing individual ACIS submission, highlighting points not
addressed, absence of contrary opinions, and points left unclear); CRS 1979 Analysis, supra note 7, at 8.
17. General Accounting Office, ID-78-48, IMPROVED PROCEDURES NEEDED FOR IDENTIFYING
PROGRAMS REQUIRING ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS, 13-16 (September 27, 1978),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/id-78-48.pdf [hereinafter GAO 1978]; Boffey 1977, supra note 15; 1979
Hearings, supra note 7, at 73, 75 (comments of Paul Walker regarding obstruction by executive agencies);
Gray, supra note 7, at 221 (citing hostility of ERDA and the Department of Energy to the entire ACIS
process during the Gerald Ford Administration). Regarding the role played by ERDA and the
Department of Energy in U.S. nuclear weapons programs, see Alice Buck, DEP’T OF ENERGY, A History
oftheEnergyResearchandDevelopmentAdministration(March1982),https://www.energy.gov/sites/default
/files/ERDA%20History.pdf; CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45306, The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Overview
of Department of Energy Sites (March 31, 2021) (describing the Department of Energy’s role in U.S. nuclear
weaponsprograms);DEP’TOFENERGYOFF.OFSCI.,LegislativeHistory,https://science.osti.gov/lp/Lab
oratory-Directed-Research-and-Development/Legislative-History (last visited Apr. 9, 2022).
18. In 1978, sec. 36 was amended to ensure the early availability of unclassified statements to
Congress and the public; to require that dual-use technology with potential military applications would
be addressed; and to allow the discussion of similar programs together as aggregates, in order to reduce
workload in writing ACIS texts. Clarke, supra note 3, at 194; Rep. Clement J. Zablocki & Sen. Charles
H. Percy, Foreword to Fiscal Year 1982 Arms Control Impact Statements iii (Feb. 1981); 1979 Hearings, supra
note 7, at 65 (comments of Paul Walker, applauding the analysis of aggregates of programs, and
recommending that this approach be carried further); Gray, supra note 7, at 224; Letter from Charles R.
Gellner to S. Foreign Rels. Comm., in CRS 1977 Analysis, supra note 12, at 1, 8-11 (suggesting ideas for
improvement in the ACIS process); CRS 1979 Analysis, supra note 7, at 3, 39, 155-56 (discussing ACIS
for functional aggregates of military programs); CRS 1979 Analysis, supra note 7, at 14-16 (advocating
discussion of aggregates of programs in an ACIS).
19. Charles R. Gellner, Library of Congress, Comments on Arms Control Impact Statement Procedures
(March 14, 1977), in Fiscal Year 1978 Arms Control Impact Statements 1-21 (April 1977) (providing seven
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The Jimmy Carter Administration was more forthcoming, with the annual
ACIS package becoming longer, more detailed, and more analytical. According to
Nancy-Ann Min, a leading chronicler of this period, these ACISs were “palpably
more balanced,” in presenting negative perspectives or concerns about the impacts
of some of the programs, even while the bottom-line assessment was invariably that
the weapon in question was deemed “not inconsistent with” U.S. arms control policy
and ongoing international negotiations.20 The four Carter-era ACIS packages ranged
between 268 and 552 pages in length; an estimated 48,000 person hours were
required to prepare the 1979 iteration.21 Most of the Carter Administration ACIS
packages were submitted weeks after the target dates. But the administration’s final
presentation, on January 15, 1981, prompted the Congressional recipients, including
Rep. Zablocki, to applaud:
This submission represents the first time since enactment of
Public Law 95-338 in 1975 that the ACIS report has been
submitted as required together with the fiscal year 1982 defense
budget request. The fiscal year 1982 ACIS submitted to the
Congress are generally well written, informative, and sufficiently
analytical to provide useful insights into the arms control
implications of major weapons programs, as was envisioned by the
Congress in 1975. The timely submission and quality of this
report should contribute to better congressional and executive
branch decisionmaking regarding the potential impact of defense
programs on the future direction of our country's national security
and arms control policies.22

model ACIS analyses of contemporary weapon programs); CRS 1977 Analysis, supra note 12, at 215-348;
see Lall, supra note 5, at 1; Boffey 1977, supra note 15 (commenting on the model ACIS); Gray, supra note
7, at 222 (noting that the Congressional Research Service studied the substance of the early ACIS
documents, while the General Accounting Office focused on the governmental process that generated
them).
20. Min, supra note 7, at 199; CRS 1979 Analysis, supra note 7, at iv, 1, 6 (commending the ACIS
submitted by the Carter Administration); Butterworth, supra note 13, at 78 (describing the FY 1979 ACIS
package as an improvement, but noting that the interagency process for generating the documents was
still acrimonious, so the finished product “is most often described by participants as the result of attrition
and exhaustion rather than consensus”); Clarke, supra note 3, at 200 (noting that during the 1976
presidential campaign, Jimmy Carter had pledged to “abide by the spirit as well as the letter” of sec. 36).
21. 1979 Hearings, supra note 7, at 4, 8 (statement by Barry M. Blechman, also noting that the
1980 ACIS package required 44,000 person hours), 77 (submission by ACDA, noting that for FY 1980,
500 program elements met the statutory requirements for ACIS, and 160 were analyzed); Clarke, supra
note 3, at 200 (observing that under Carter, ACDA greatly increased its ACIS staff, to between sixteen
and twenty analysts).
22.
at iii.

Rep. Clement J. Zablocki & Sen. Charles H. Percy, Foreword to FY 1982 ACIS, supra note 18,
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The Ronald Reagan Administration tacked in the opposite direction
regarding ACIS. It drastically reduced the ACDA staff hours devoted to the project,
while vigorously increasing the military programs that would be addressed by those
annual evaluations.23 The subsequent ACIS submissions were generally shorter and
less detailed; some were submitted on a timely basis, while others were months late.24
As had become standard, the documents were delivered in both classified and
unclassified form.25 Also, the ACDA Director’s cover letter generally continued to
reflect rote comments to the effect that arms control assessment was not an exact
science, that it was necessarily a subjective process, based on incomplete information,
and that the statements incorporated alternate points of view. The submittal package
also routinely concluded that “all of the programs analyzed…are consistent with
current U.S. security and arms control policy.”26

C. Concluding ACIS Practice
The end of the cold war in 1990-91 and the consequent revolutions in global
political and security relationships could have inspired a new “golden age” for ACIS.
It could have triggered a renewed emphasis upon the intended careful and critical
analysis of the bigger-picture and longer-term implications of weapons programs,
with a corresponding imperative to escape “business as usual” in defense
procurement. In fact, however, the annual ACIS packages did not rise to that

23.

Min, supra note 7, at 202-03.

24. Compare Fiscal Year 1983 Arms Control Impact Statements (1982) (submitted on time, 391 pages),
Fiscal Year 1985 Arms Control Impact Statement (1984) (383 pages), FY 1987 ACIS, supra note 19 (144 pages,
plus appendices), and Fiscal Year 1988 Arms Control Impact Statements (1987) (submitted two months late,
211 pages, plus appendices).
25. See, e.g., ACIS 1987, supra note 19, at v (submittal letters by Kenneth L. Adelman presenting
classified and unclassified versions of ACIS), FY 1988 ACIS, supra note 24, at v; 122 Cong. Rec. 30,974
(1976) (reprinting letter from Congressional Research Service complaining that the 1976 ACIS package
was initially presented entirely in classified form, and then reprinting the later unclassified versions); 1979
Hearings, supra note 7, at 66, 75 (comments of Paul Walker, critiquing excessive classification and
deletions in ACIS). Note the ACIS submissions were initially drafted in classified form, and then
numerous excisions were made prior to public release, with many passages marked as “Deleted.” An
alternative approach, employed for some other types of documents, would have been to prepare both
classified and unclassified versions of the documents ab initio, so that the publicly released version could
have been a complete narrative, without the intermittent marked deletions, which impede comprehension.
See Fiscal Year 1980 Arms Control Impact Statements 68-71 (1979) (indicating there are so many deletions in
the discussion of outer space programs that the text is virtually meaningless).
26. See, e.g., Letter of Submittal from George M. Seignious II, reprinted in FY 1980 ACIS, supra
note 25, at v; Letter of Submittal from Eugene V. Rostow, reprinted in FY 1983 ACIS, supra note 24, at v;
Letter of Submittal from Kenneth L. Adelman, reprinted in FY 1985 ACIS, supra note 24, at v; and FY 1988
ACIS, supra note 24, at v; contra 1979 Hearings, supra note 7, at 7 (statement of Barry M. Blechman,
observing that arms control assessments are always uncertain, as changing technology adds to the difficulty
of making hard and fast judgments); 1979 Hearings, supra note 7, at 65 (comments of Paul Walker,
critiquing “on the one hand – on the other hand” style of writing in ACIS), 77 (response by ACDA to
Walker’s comments).
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opportunity. They became even more scanty and unenlightening, not responding to
the rapidly-shifting worldwide political conditions and remaining oddly removed
from the decision-makers’ needs for sharp, substantive analysis.27 Despite
congressional urging to give ACIS new gusto, the executive branch seemingly lost
interest in the undertaking, other than instituting a few modest tweaks in the
statements’ format.28
Eventually, the participants mutually concluded that the entire enterprise
had run its course, and the Fiscal Year 1994 submission completed the arc of ACIS
with a package comprising only forty-two pages that addressed a mere seventeen
programs.29 The statutory provision for ACIS, in Section 36 of the ACDA statute,

27. In the post-cold war environment, the annual ACIS submissions shrank from 209 pages in FY
1991, to 119 pages in FY 1992, to 57 pages in FY 1993, to 42 pages in FY 1994. Arms Control Impact
Statements for Fiscal Years 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994; see Rep. Dante B. Fascell & Sen. Claiborne Pell,
Foreword to Fiscal Year 1991 Arms Control Impact Statements iii-iv (1990) (“Given the sweeping changes
occurring in the political and military environment, it is disappointing that the ACIS give no attention to
the possibility that weapon system plans could be affected by these changes. Indeed, this mission serves
to give the impression that the ACIS have become almost completely removed from the realities of
decision-making in a changing world. We strongly urge that the Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency take a personal interest in and give new direction to the ACIS process so that the
1991 statements have both relevance and value.”); NEW PURPOSES AND PRIORITIES FOR ARMS
CONTROL: REPORT TO SHERMAN M. FUNK, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF ACDA 33 (1992) [hereinafter
Report to IG].
28. Rep. Dante B. Fascell & Sen. Claiborne Pell, Foreword to Fiscal Year 1992 Arms Control Impact
Statements iii-iv (1991) (acknowledging some positive modifications in the ACIS formatting, but arguing
that “[n]onetheless, the statements would benefit from a sharper, more substantive analysis. In reading
the statements, it is evident that the ACIS are influenced by an interagency clearance process which tends,
unless well controlled, to avoid issues rather than clarify them . . . We would suggest that the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency should start afresh with its next impact statements. ACDA should be expected
to be willing, even eager, to take a serious look at arms control considerations which are raised by various
military programs. It should be possible to be insightful and informative without contradicting current
policy decisions. Each of the executive branch agencies has its interests to protect and its own particular
obligations. But, each agency should also be in the forefront of those advocating strong and effective arms
control. The ACIS could and should be an important part of that effort.”); Rep. Dante B. Fascell & Sen.
Claiborne Pell, Foreword to Fiscal Year 1993 Arms Control Impact Statements iv (1992) (concluding that
“[o]n the whole, the FY 93 Arms Control Impact Statements do not to any significant degree reflect the
impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on U.S. weapons systems and U.S. arms control policy.”); see
also Gray, supra note 7, at 227 (reporting that by 1979, there was already “a growing belief that the ACIS
process had gotten out of control”); Report to IG, supra note 27, at 33 (“There is universal agreement in
the executive branch that arms control impact statements are meaningless. The same view is held by many
on the Hill.”)
29. See Rep. Lee Hamilton & Sen. Claiborne Pell, Foreword to Fiscal Year 1994 Arms Control
Impact Statements iii (1993) (observing that in view of immense post-cold war changes, “Congress and
the executive branch are rethinking the relevance of many arms control activities including the ACIS.
Legislation pending before the Congress would strengthen and revitalize ACDA and refocus those
engaged in the preparation of the ACIS on newer, potentially more productive arms control challenges.
Accordingly, this may be the last volume in the ACIS series.”); S. REP. NO. 103-172, at 13 (1993) (noting
that even in the greatly reduced final version, the production of ACIS required 7,750 person-hours
annually within the executive branch, which could have been reallocated to other priorities).
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was substantially abolished in 1994.30 The agency itself was merged into the
Department of State, dissolving its independent identity in 1997-99.31

D. Requiem for ACIS.
Upon reflection, the original goals for the concept of ACIS retain their
validity and importance, but they were never realized or even approached in
practice.32 There is little evidence that the perennial statement-writing fracas
contributed to better decision-making within the executive branch, nor that it
provided useful reams of otherwise unobtainable information for the edification of
Congressional or public audiences, nor that it contributed to augmenting the stature
of ACDA within the inner councils of government.33
The biggest recurrent problem with the ACIS mechanism was the
inescapable bureaucratic fact that the documents were always generated via an
intensely antagonistic interagency process that required consensus (i.e., unanimity)
among oppositional organizations. The nearly invariant pattern involved ACDA (as
drafter) battling against the Departments of Defense and Energy (as proponents of
the controversial programs) with the Department of State being largely a passive
observer, and the National Security Council staff attempting to broker acceptable
compromises.34 The executive branch enforced a rigid internal discipline, forbidding
30. S. REP. NO. 103-172, supra note 29, at 13 (supporting repeal of sec. 36, eliminating the
requirement for ACDA to produce ACIS reports).
31. Susan B. Epstein, Steven A. Hildreth, & Larry Nowels, CONG. RSCH. SERV. 97-538,
FOREIGN POLICY AGENCY REORGANIZATION IN THE 105TH CONGRESS 7 (November 6, 1998),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/97-538/2; Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., In Memoriam: ACDA
(1961-1997), ARMS CONTROL TODAY 2 (April 1997); Liz Dee, The ACDA-USIA Merger into State – The
End of an Era, ASSOCIATION FOR DIPLOMATIC STUDIES & TRAINING (Oct. 18, 2016),
https://adst.org/2016/10/acda-usia-merger-into-state-end-of-an-era/.
32. See supra, text accompanying notes 6-8 (discussing original goals for ACIS); Gray, supra note
7, at 228 (opining that the ACIS process can reasonably claim to have helped accomplish two of its original
goals – to inform Congress better, and to enhance the stature of ACDA – but it did not accomplish much
on the first goal, to influence government decisions regarding weapon programs); Butterworth, supra note
13, at 79-82 (criticizing ACIS failure on all three original goals); Clarke, supra note 3, at 100-08 (describing
ACDA’s persistent problems gaining access to necessary information to participate fully in interagency
deliberations).
33. See Lall, supra note 5, at 3 (emphasizing the need for the ACIS process to ensure that ACDA
was more fully and currently informed about the details of emerging weapons and technologies that could
prove problematic for arms control policy and negotiations); CONG. RSCH. SERV., Fundamentals of Nuclear
Arms Control, Part IX – The Congressional Role in Nuclear Arms Control, June 1986, 26 INT’L LEGAL
MATERIALS 258, 273 (1987) [hereinafter Congressional Role], p. 22 (noting that the ACIS reports were
not adequately utilized by Congress; they were seldom mentioned in debates and did not provoke protests
over controversial decisions. Moreover, instead of helping integrate ACDA into the interagency process,
the ACIS process antagonized the Department of Defense); Butterworth, supra note 13, at 79 (noting only
one instance in which an ACIS played a role in a Congressional decision about a pending weapon).
34. See 1979 Hearings, supra note 7, at 67 (comments of Paul Walker) (discussing ACDA
leadership and interagency coordination in preparing ACIS); Gray, supra note 7, at 222-23 (reporting that
for the FY 1979 ACIS package, eight of the thirty-two documents had to be referred to the National
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public airing of internecine disagreements, so no public dissent was tolerated
regarding a statement’s bottom line or the underlying analysis.35 The persistent
imperative of avoiding public displays of disaffection generated endless rancorous
meetings and demanded minute wordsmithing over draft after draft of an evolving
ACIS submission to reconcile or to paper over the competing perspectives.36
The timing of the annual ACIS submissions also presented repeated
problems. The legislators’ original concept was that these documents would be
submitted simultaneously with the President’s budget, so Congress could exercise its
Security Council for resolution, after the interagency participants had reached deadlock); Butterworth,
supra note 13, at 79-80 (suggesting that the Departments of Energy and Defense viewed the ACIS process
in damage-limiting terms, how to preserve their jurisdictional independence; ACDA and the Department
of State saw ACIS in imperialist terms, how to increase their influence in weapons decisions; and the
National Security Council staff handled the task as one of conflict management, how to minimize
interagency discord). Note that for the first two years, the Department of Defense and ERDA drafted
and submitted ACIS regarding their own programs; after that, a National Security Council memorandum
assigned ACDA the lead interagency responsibility for the drafting and submission of all ACIS. Clarke,
supra note 3, at 197-200; 1979 Hearings, supra note 7, at 75 (comments of Paul Walker); CRS 1979 Analysis,
supra note 7, at 5 n.4.
35. 1979 Hearings, supra note 7, at 36-37 (noting that some national intelligence estimates do
include a presentation of dissenting views, but in ACIS, the practice was for agencies to discuss their
varying perspectives until they could reach a common expression). But see Gray, supra note 7, at 222-26
(citing the FY 1978 additional ACIS for the enhanced radiation (“neutron bomb”) warhead for the Lance
missile, which concluded that the weapon’s impact on ongoing negotiations would be “marginally
negative,” and citing the skepticism and candor in the accompanying ACIS documents about the airlaunched cruise missile and ICBMs); Clarke, supra note 3, at 201; CRS 1979 Analysis, supra note 7, at 7;
Butterworth, supra note 13, at 79.
36. See 122 Cong. Rec. 30,974 (1976) (reprinting letter from Congressional Research Service
discussing the dilemma for the executive branch when there is internal disagreement about the consistency
between arms control and a particular new weapon – perhaps the contradiction can be resolved internally,
but perhaps the result will be an ACIS that papers over the disagreement with generalized or unspecific
language in order to dodge the issue); Barry M. Blechman & Janne E. Nolan, Reorganizing for More Effective
Arms Negotiations, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1157, 1168-69 (1983) (writing “Obviously, no administration is going
to request funds from the Congress for a weapon system and simultaneously inform the legislators that
the system would have an adverse impact on important negotiations.”); 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, at
155 (ACDA director Fred C. Ikle observing that a president would not allow one agency to issue a formal
report containing comments that depart from the administration’s formal budget presentation) But see
RiseinSovietMissilesLikely,WASHINGTONPOST,(Apr.23,1985),https://www.washingtonpost.com/arc
hive/politics/1985/04/23/rise-in-soviet-missiles-likely/831c7fe8-42bc-4364-a02b-0eb2e0aa2fe0/
(identifying a public conflict between an ACIS prepared by ACDA and a Pentagon report on the effect
that the Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”) might have on arms control negotiations).
Sometimes, the annual submission letter from the ACDA director noted that the ACIS presented
alternative points of view. In those instances, the analyses included comments in the form of “some
believe X; others believe Y” or comments reflecting the view that a particular weapon program might be
beneficial for arms control in some ways and harmful in others. In contrast, other annual ACIS packages
did not include presentation of competing views, and simply asserted that the programs being analyzed
were fully consistent with U.S. legal obligations and policy objectives. In no case did an ACIS present
discussion of “alternatives” to the weapons being discussed, as would occur in an environmental impact
statement. See cover letter to FY 1980 ACIS, supra note 25, at 18, 55, 59-60, 78, 91 (discussing alternative
perspectives); FY 1988 ACIS, supra note 24, at 51, 69 (one-sided presentation of positive effect of weapons
programs on arms control interests).
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authorization and appropriations functions with full access to the details of the
defense programs and with insight about their arms control implications. In fact,
however, the ACIS were repeatedly submitted late, weeks or months after the
budget. It became clear that the government agencies were developing the ACIS
paperwork only after the key decisions had already been made in favor of proceeding
with the affected weapons programs, and the proffered documents were part of the
“sales pitch” rather than being part of the deliberative process.37 This timing is in
stark contrast to the designed role that an environmental impact statement is
intended to play in governmental decision-making, as elaborated in the next Section.
Even when the ACIS instruments were delivered in a timelier fashion, their
content did not provide much assistance to congressional recipients. The documents
about a particular program were not dramatically different from one year to the next
(in part because the underlying weapons activities usually did not evolve rapidly),
and the language became routine and repetitive, relying upon rote, conclusory text
that had previously survived the interagency clearance process.38
Perhaps it should not be surprising that the ACIS submissions were
routinely politicized, to serve the executive branch’s interests. The documents
gingerly dealt with large, expensive programs, described as being fundamental to the
President’s strategic vision during some of the most consequential phases of the cold
war and its aftermath.39 So there was a lot at stake, both in budgetary and geopolitical
terms. The ACIS mechanism proceeded without much outside engagement, with no
routine interim input generated from the public or from Congress until that year’s
package was finalized and submitted. Even if the ACIS packages from the Carter
Administration were generally longer, more detailed, and more deeply analytical than
the submissions of its Republican predecessor and successor, the difference in
efficacy was small.
Procedurally, it is noteworthy (especially for comparison to the analogous
environmental documentation, discussed infra) that the annual ACIS presentations
evolved into a two-tier structure, with some programs being assessed in detail and a

37. 1979 Hearings, supra note 7, at 4, 8 (testimony of Barry M. Blechman, noting that the ACIS
deal with “programs the administration has already decided to pursue”), 16 (discussing slight changes that
the ACIS process may have made in some weapon programs), 83 (supplemental response, indicating that
ACIS do not “play a discernible role in the weapon system decision process.”); Gray, supra note 7, at 230
(recommending that an ACIS process would be more effective if the analyses and documents were more
effectively meshed with the standard military timetable and benchmarks for developing new weapons).
38. For example, the ACIS packages for FY 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983 all addressed
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, air-launched missiles, missile
defense systems, chemical weapons, and directed energy weapons, often in very similar terms.
39. See, e.g., Letter of submittal by Eugene V. Rostow, reprinted in FY 1983 ACIS, supra note 24,
at v (asserting that the reported programs “are essential to the development or maintenance of the United
States military strength necessary to achieve a military balance with our principal adversary, to deter
aggression, and to support and enhance international stability. The programs will permit us to pursue arms
control objectives in a way which will enhance our security.”).
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great many more being mentioned in the briefest fashion.40 Likewise, the ACIS
submissions were always presented in both classified and unclassified forms.41
Additionally, ACIS practice concentrated exclusively on weapons programs
belonging to the Departments of Defense and Energy; there were few serious
attempts to address emerging but unripe technologies,42 nor to write about any
diplomatic arms control initiatives (or failures to take initiative) on the part of ACDA
or the Department of State.
Another point of comparison is the fact that the invariant bottom-line
assessment for the annual ACIS submission was a judgment that all the programs
were consistent with all existing U.S. legal obligations and with U.S. government
arms control policy.43 In contrast, an environmental impact statement does not
usually rest upon any such ultimate conclusion – as discussed infra, the practice in
that field has been for the assessment statement merely to present the relevant facts
and analyses, and then to allow the broader political and legal processes to draw and
act upon their own conclusions.44
That leads to a final aspect of the ACIS system, the lack of an effective
“enforcement” procedure. Congressional leaders who might find an annual
submission inadequate had little immediate remedy. They could write thunderous
letters to the ACDA director,45 they could hold oversight hearings, or they could try
to extract concessions via other legislative tools.46 But there was no recourse to
courts47 and no other handy tool for punishing poor behavior. Similarly, the general
40. See, e.g., FY 1980 ACIS, supra note 25, at 251 (presenting “abbreviated” ACIS, explaining that
“none of these activities is judged to have a significant impact on arms control policy or negotiations”);
FY 1988 ACIS, at 142 (listing programs for which an ACIS had been previously submitted and others for
which no ACIS was deemed necessary); FY 1990 ACIS, at 112 (same).
41. See supra, text accompanying note 25 (presenting examples of ACIS in classified and
unclassified form).
42.

See infra note 18 (discussing ACIS regarding dual-use technologies).

43. See, e.g., FY 1994 ACIS, Letter of Submittal from Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Director of
ACDA, in FY 1994 ACIS, June 23, 1993, v (concluding that all studied programs “are consistent with
current U.S. security and arms control policies.”); Letter of Submittal from Ralph Earle II, reprinted in
FY 1980 ACIS, supra note 25, at v (asserting both that the studied programs were “consistent with” existing
U.S. legal obligations and “not inconsistent with” U.S. arms control policy.)
44.

See infra, section II.

45. See, e.g., letter from Sens. Sparkman and Case, supra note 12, to ACDA director Paul C.
Warnke (complaining about low quality ACIS that were submitted before he took office, and expressing
the hope that he would devote personal attention to improving that performance); Rep. Clement J.
Zablocki, Foreword to Additional Arms Control Impact Statements and Evaluations for FY 1978 iii (quoting
pledge by ACDA Director Paul C. Warnke to do his best to improve the quality and responsiveness of
ACIS, assuring the committee that he would carry out the letter and spirit of the law).
46. Boffey 1976, supra note 6, at 37 (discussing possible congressional responses to inadequate
ACIS submissions); Congressional Role, supra note 33, at 12-34 (describing how Congress can influence
weapons funding decisions); 1979 Hearings, supra note 7, at 67 (comments of Paul Walker, suggesting
tactics Congress could use to obtain better ACIS submissions).
47. Sec. 36, supra note 4, (c) (“No court shall have any jurisdiction under any law to compel the
performance of any requirement of this section or to review the adequacy of the performance of any such
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public – the other intended beneficiary of meaningful ACIS submissions – was also
largely bereft of any mechanism for effective engagement or enforcement.
In sum, it is hard to identify any significant positive accomplishments or
any adequate payoff for the Sturm und Drang that generated an ACIS.48
Congressional leaders had high hopes for a concept that had produced such important
accomplishments in the field of environmental law, but the transplantation proved
unsuccessful, and the arms control statutory obligation was terminated with barely a
whimper of protest. The next Section of this Article, therefore, turns to address
environmental law, the home base of the assessment statement process, to inquire
how the mechanism came to play such a profound, enduring role in that milieu.

II. Environmental Impact Statements
The genesis of the ACIS process was inspired by the resounding success of
the seemingly similar, pathbreaking mechanism in the realm of environmental law:
the program for rigorous, highly structured environmental analysis mandated by
NEPA and its progeny.49 This section of the Article does not purport to provide a
comprehensive portrait of environmental law, or a catalog of the ever-growing
cavalcade of NEPA litigation. Instead, it seeks simply to identify the salient
characteristics of the statutory scheme and the key features of environmental
assessment programs that might be most relevant for a comparison to the world of
arms control.
At the highest level, the national environmental policy grandly declared by
Congress was “to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can
exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements
of present and future generations of Americans.”50 This statute does not
independently impose substantive obligations or restrictions – those are largely the
province of other environmental legislation and regulation, implanting specified
tolerances for emissions into air and water, for preservation of endangered species,

requirement on the part of any Government agency.”); Boffey 1976, supra note 6, at 37 (observing that
the specification against any private right of action had been inserted into sec. 36 “at the insistence of
congressional ‘hawks’ who feared that lawsuits might be filed to block military programs whose impact
statements were deemed deficient”).
48. 1979 Hearings, supra note 7, at 13, 16 (statement of Walter Slocombe, concluding that “we are
not convinced that whatever additional measure of arms control sensitivity these statements may generate
within the executive branch is sufficient to offset the costs, chiefly in time, incurred in their preparation
or in the very difficult and time-consuming interagency coordination process required”), 18-19 (witnesses
agree that the interagency clearance process for ACIS “has not produced a product worth the vast resources
that have gone into it”).
49.

See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION (2d ed., 2021).

50. NEPA, supra note 1, § 101 (42 USC § 4331(a)); see also Weinberger v. Cath. Action of Haw.,
454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981) (Justice Rehnquist identifying two primary goals of NEPA: to inject
environmental considerations into federal agency decision-making and to inform the public).
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for restoring contaminated lands, etc.51 Instead, NEPA is regarded as “procedural,”
in requiring a deliberative and public decision-making process before the federal
government undertakes actions that might carry important implications for the
natural environment.52
Accordingly, for any “major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment,” a “detailed statement” must be prepared utilizing
“a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the
natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts”. This statement is to
evaluate “(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse
environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local shortterm uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.”53
Compliance with this novel environmental assessment obligation is mandatory, not
discretionary, for federal agencies.54
In short, NEPA does not by itself preclude the federal government from
approving and undertaking actions that would negatively impact the environment in
important ways. Instead, it merely prevents the government from doing so out of
ignorance, in secret, and without paying due attention to the alternatives and the
long-range consequences.55 Several features of the NEPA process may therefore
carry useful lessons for its arms control counterpart, including both ideas to borrow
and to avoid.

51. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q). (1970); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387(1972); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1973); Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6992(k)(1976). Mandelker, supra note 49, § 2:4 (explaining that in
legislating NEPA, Congress intended to require federal agencies to emphasize environmental protection
more fully, but Congress did not anticipate how important the EIS process would become); Linda Luther,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33152, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (NEPA):
BACKGROUND AND IMPLEMENTATION 7 (Jan. 10, 2011) (describing NEPA as an “action-forcing” statute,
rather than as a regulatory statute that would establish standards for protection of air, water, wetlands,
etc.).
52. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (2022) (describing NEPA as a procedural statute that “does not mandate
particular results or substantive outcomes”); Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 2:5, 10:10 (observing that the
text of NEPA could have been construed to carry substantive content, but that has not been the prevailing
interpretation), 10:1 (explaining that NEPA’s “procedural” nature does not mean that a reviewing court
assesses the procedures that an agency followed in preparing an EIS, but that the court will examine the
adequacy of the EIS).
53.

NEPA, supra note 1, § 102 (42 U.S.C § 4332(A), (C)).

54.

Mandelker, supra note 49, § 1:1.

55. STEPHEN DYCUS, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13 (1996) (“An agency is
free in principle to make a foolish decision but not an uninformed one.”) [hereinafter Dycus]
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A. Tiers of Review56
The NEPA program allows considerable flexibility; not every covered
project requires a single, full-length EIS. In a nutshell, there are three tiers of review.
First, agencies’ NEPA procedures can identify some activities as Categorically
Excluded, based on a published record that no significant environmental impacts are
anticipated or that other similar undertakings in the past have not generated
significant effects.57 Second, if there may be anticipated environmental impacts, then
the analytical process typically begins with an “Environmental Assessment.” This is
a pilot document that addresses the scope of the government’s contemplated action
and alternatives to it, ultimately producing a short written evaluative document that
is generally informed by public comment.58 The Environmental Assessment
ordinarily leads to either a Finding of No Significant Impact, which would usually
be the end of the analytical process, or a determination that the third tier, a full EIS,
should be prepared next.59
Even then, however, NEPA provides different types of documentation.
For example, in a very large, wide-scale undertaking, there could be a
“programmatic” EIS to address the overall national scope, supplemented by a family
of “site specific” EISs or environmental assessments to address the program’s special
aspects at particular locations.60
Usually, an EIS is a single document, done one time for the project (unlike
the original ACIS, which were submitted annually). However, if something
significant changes with the government’s contemplated action, or with its

56. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.11 (2022);Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 9:12 (discussing tiering). See also
Id. at 9:14 (discussing the “segmentation problem”–when to combine two or more proposed federal actions
into a single action for EIS purposes), 9:20 (discussing multistage projects); Luther, supra note 51, at 15.
57. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4, 1508.1(d) (2022); Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 2:15, 7:16 (noting several
statutory categorical exclusions), 7:15 (noting voluminous litigation about the propriety of a categorical
exclusion); COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY, A Citizen’s Guide to NEPA: Having Your Voice Heard 10 (Jan.
2021),https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021/01/f82/ceq-citizens-guide-to-nepa-2021.pdf
[hereinafter Citizen’s Guide]; Luther, supra note 51, at 14.
58. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.5, 1501.10 (2022) (prescribing that an Environmental Assessment should be
no longer than seventy-five pages and be completed within one year); Mandelker, supra note 49, § 7:19;
Citizen’s Guide, supra note 57, at 10-11; Luther, supra note 51, at 18.
59. 40 C.F.R. 1501.6 (2022); Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 7:19, 7:21; Citizen’s Guide, supra note
57, at 8, 12-13; Luther, supra note 51, at 16-18.
60. See e.g., U.S. Army, Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Chemical Stockpile
Disposal Program, Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (January 1988),
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiug.30112104107609&view=1up&seq=1 (programmatic EIS for the
overall campaign to destroy U.S. chemical weapons); J.W. Terry, et. al., OAK RIDGE NAT’L
LABORATORY, Disposal of Chemical Agents and Munitions Stored at Pueblo Depot Activity, Colorado: Final
Phase I Environmental Report (April 1995), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc619399/ (one
of the supplemental site-specific EISs for the particular locations where the activities would occur);
Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 8:58, 9:2-9:4. See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976); Dycus,
supra note 55, at 14-15.
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anticipated or newly discovered environmental effects, it may be necessary to prepare
a supplemental EIS.61
Another variant is the “legislative EIS,” an analysis prepared by the
executive branch to accompany a document – such as a treaty submitted to the Senate
– where the initial proposed major federal action would occur inside the Congress,
rather than with the physical breaking of ground.62

B. Coverage
The concept of a “major” federal action, and the concept of an action that
“significantly” affects the environment have been read expansively.63 In parallel, the
concept of a “federal” action has also acquired a capacious ambit, embracing not only
construction and other projects conducted directly by federal agencies themselves,
but also agency rule-making and permitting activities that empower other actors, as
well as state and local programs that are funded with federal assistance.64 Notably, a
proposed program will also demand thorough environmental assessment if it is likely
to generate a high level of public controversy, even apart from the raw scale of its
environmental effects.65 An advanced emerging new technology, such as the once61. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(d) (2022); Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 7-21, 10:68, 10:70 (discussing
supplemental EIS); Citizen’s Guide, supra note 57, at 16-17; Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 399 F. Supp. 2d 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
62. 40 C.F.R. §1506.8 (2022); Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 4:30, 5:22 (discussing environmental
review of international agreements on commercial trade), 8:33 (observing that NEPA’s requirement for
impact statements on proposed legislation is “a much-neglected provision,” and few cases have addressed
it); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993); U.S DEP’T OF THE AIR
FORCE, Legislative Envt’l Impact Statement: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Dec. 1991), available at
https://books.google.com/books?id=mt43AQAAMAAJ&pg=PP7&lpg=PP7&dq=Legislative+Environme
ntal+Impact+Statement:+Strategic+Arms+Reduction+Treaty+(LEIS+START)+(Dec.+1991)&source=bl
&ots=uErjxdqFeX&sig=ACfU3U3tULY8DNs_1cenkm7I9BFqS7e_pg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiG
-uCxpMryAhXjkOAKHdjVAywQ6AF6BAgUEAM#v=onepage&q=Legislative%20Environmental%20I
mpact%20Statement%3A%20Strategic%20Arms%20Reduction%20Treaty%20(LEIS%20START)%20(D
ec.%201991)&f=false; U.S. DEP’T.’ OF THE AIR FORCE, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II)
Supplemental Legislative Environmental Impact Statement (May, 1993); U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY, Environmental Assessment for the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Other
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (undated, issued in 1978).
63. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.1(g) (2022) (defining the “effects” that must be addressed, to include those
that are reasonably foreseeable, that are reasonably closely connected to the proposed action, and that
address ecological, aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic, social or health aspects); Mandelker, supra note
49, chapter 8, §§ 8:27 (discussing as a federal “action” an agency’s decision not to act), 8:37; Citizen’s
Guide supra note 57, at 14-15; Luther, supra note 51, at 14-15.
64. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.1(q) (2022); Scis. Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 481
F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (affirming broad scope of EIS requirement); Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 1:4,
8:19, 8:20; Luther, supra note 51, at 11-13.
65. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4) (2022) (former citation); Mandelker, supra note 49, § 8:53 (noting
that the “controversy” requirement is grounded in CEQ regulations, not in the NEPA statute); Hanly v.
Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972) (noting that Council on Environmental Quality guidelines
suggest that formal impact statements should be prepared for proposed actions in which the environmental

278

Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law

Vol. 11:2

promising liquid metal fast breeder nuclear reactor, is also an appropriate subject for
environmental analysis, even before it fully ripens.66 In rare instances, a statutory
waiver or exemption will remove a project or a cluster of actions, from NEPA’s
coverage.67 A federal agency is required to comply simultaneously with both NEPA
and its own substantive statutes – neither source of law provides an authority to
dodge the requirements of the other.68
In many instances, NEPA controversies present a “mixed” question of law
and fact – a reviewing court may be required to apply the statutory standard to the
contents of a particular proffered EIS to determine whether the document’s analysis
is sufficiently broad and detailed to satisfy the legal criteria.69

C. Timing
Environmental impact assessment is supposed to be undertaken at the
outset of a project, early enough so that its results can be factored into the agency’s
planning process in a timely fashion.70 The idea is precisely not to require the
generation of an after-the-fact paper trail that would justify a decision that the agency
had already made. Instead, the key concept is that the U.S. government will make

impact is likely to be highly controversial); William Murray Tabb, The Role of Controversy in NEPA:
Reconciling Public Veto with Public Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking, 21 WM. & MARY ENV'T
L. & POL'Y REV. 175 (1997) (proposing a multi-factor test to guide agencies and courts in determining
whether a major federal project is highly controversial such that it affects agency duties under NEPA);
Stephen Dycus, Nuclear War: Still the Gravest Threat to the Environment, 25 VT. L. REV. 753 (2001) (arguing
for an EIS to address the potentially catastrophic effects of nuclear war, even if the probability of
occurrence is low).
66. Scientists’ Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Mandelker, supra note 49, at 9:9.
67. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, § 102(c)(1), 104 Pub.
L. No. 208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996); see 8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 note; Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 2:40
(discussing statute exempting from NEPA and other environmental laws the construction of a border wall
along the southern U.S. border), 2:42 (discussing federal legislation aimed at speeding economic recovery
from the 2008 Great Recession, for which Congress considered, but did not adopt broad waivers from
NEPA, but did adopt a provision requiring more expeditious NEPA review); 2:51 (describing a series of
executive orders aimed at streamlining NEPA procedures and shortening the review timetables).
68. NEPA directs federal agencies to interpret and administer other federal law in a manner
consistent with NEPA policies. NEPA, supra note 1, § 104 (42 USC § 4334); Mandelker, supra note 49,
§§ 1:1, 2:21.
69. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Marsh v. Ore. Nat. Res. Council,
490 U.S. 360 (1989); Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 3:6, 8:4.
70. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.2(2022) (rule requiring agencies to “Apply NEPA early in the process”),
1502.5 (2020); see also Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 8:14, 8:17 (addressing the challenging question of at
what point a “proposal” for agency action has arisen, requiring assessment under NEPA); Kleppe v. Sierra
Club, 427 U.S. 390, 417 (1976) (Marshall, J. concurring in part) (“But an early start on the [environmental
impact] statement is more than a procedural necessity. Early consideration of environmental consequences
through production of an environmental impact statement is the whole point of NEPA, as the Court
recognizes.”).
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better choices if it assembles and relies upon all types of relevant information as
crucial inputs, before or while the matter is resolved. NEPA can help arrest the
powerful momentum that a major proposal can accumulate, especially once
significant financial and political capital has already been poured into it.71

D. Content
The statute and regulations require a “systematic, interdisciplinary” study
of environmental consequences, integrating natural, social, and environmental
sciences.72 Congress insisted upon a fact-based approach, so decision-makers could
not rely upon intuition or bias, but would have to leaven their agency’s initial
orientation with a study of alternative perspectives. An agency is required to take a
“hard look” at the tradeoffs at stake, not automatically deferring to the simplest, most
direct routes toward accomplishment of its substantive agenda.73 The cumulative
effects of disparate parts of a program are to be assessed together, and both direct
and indirect effects must be included.74
In addition, the proponent is required to identify reasonable alternatives to
the initially favored course of action,75 to consider measures that could mitigate
adverse environmental effects,76 and to solicit and respond to responsible opposing

71.

Mandelker, supra note 49, § 7:14; Citizen’s Guide, supra note 57, at 6.

72.

NEPA, supra note 1, § 102(2)(A); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.6 (2022).

73. See Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97, 100 (1983);
ROBERTSON V. METHOW VALLEY CITIZENS, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
74. See Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 1:6 (suggesting that recent Supreme Court decisions may
have diluted NEPA’s “hard look” requirement.), 10:53, 10:55 (discussing treatment of cumulative effects
in an EIS), 10:63 (discussing bias and predetermination flaws in an EIS); Nina M. Hart & Linda Tsang,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11549, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT (Sept. 22, 2021) (discussing 2020 CEQ regulations that narrow the consideration of
cumulative effects of a proposed action).
75. NEPA, supra note 1, §§ 102(2)(C)(iii), 102(D) (42 USC § 4332 (C), (E)); 40 C.F.R. §
1501.9(e)(2), 1502.14 (2022); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Vt.
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Monroe Cnty.
Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir. 1972) (describing the analysis of
alternatives as the “linchpin” of NEPA); Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 9:21, 3:8 (describing “hard look”
as the standard applicable both to the agency’s analysis of environmental consequences and to a court
reviewing the agency’s work), 10:29 (discussing judicial review of an agency’s consideration of alternative
courses of action in an EIS); Citizen’s Guide, supra note 57, at 13 (explaining that the agency must present
and evaluate reasonable alternatives, defined as those that are practical or feasible from the technical and
economic standpoint; a reasonable range of feasible alternatives must be presented in sufficient detail to
permit effective comparisons). NEPA analysis can consider two different types of alternatives. A primary
alternative is a substitute that would accomplish the agency’s objectives via a different action. A secondary
alternative would concede that the agency’s proposed action is necessary but suggest that it be carried out
in a different manner. Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 9:21, 10:33 (discussing reasonable alternatives), 10:34,
10:35 (primary and secondary alternatives).
76.

40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(a)(9) (2022); Mandelker, supra note 49, §§8:67, 10:60.
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voices.77 The agency is also required to prepare a “concise public record of decision,”
to explain the rationale for its ultimate choice.78
Notably, an EIS is mandated to study and publicize all the environmental
effects of a proposed program – including those that would be beneficial as well as
those anticipated to be harmful.79 In that context, it is noteworthy that objections
(and litigation) regarding an EIS can spring from parties such as real estate
developers or others who might promote the government’s original contemplated
action and want it to proceed untrammeled, just as from environmentalists, who
might resist the proposal.80 In an appropriate case, an EIS must also give due
consideration to possible environmental effects that are unlikely to occur, but that
would carry very large adverse results if they did occur.81

E. Author
The particular federal agency that sponsors the proposed action ordinarily
takes the lead in drafting an EIS, but it is required to consult other cooperating
agencies that have relevant jurisdiction or special expertise.82 The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) also reviews, comments on, and publishes other agencies’
environmental assessments.83 In addition, the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) has the authority to promulgate binding regulations that shape the EIS
process and to resolve disagreements among affected agencies.84

77. 40 C.F.R. §1503.1, 1503.4 (2022); Mandelker, supra note 49, § 10:65 (discussing agency’s
responsibility to obtain and respond to comments).
78.

40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 (2022); Mandelker, supra note 49, § 7:27.

79.

40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.3(b)(2), 1508.1(g)(1) (2022).

80. See Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 1:6 (observing that the overall litigation success rate for proenvironment plaintiffs was slightly higher than that for pro-development plaintiffs), 8:43 (requirement to
study beneficial effects).
81. Mandelker, supra note 49, § 8:52; City of New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.2d 732
(2d Cir. 1983).
82. NEPA, supra note 1, § 102(C), 42 USC § 4332(C); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2022);
Mandelker, supra note 49, § 7:4 (discussing lead and cooperating agencies); Luther, supra note 51, at 2122. NEPA’s strategy was that having the proponent do the drafting of an EIS would integrate NEPA’s
goals more effectively into each agency’s institutional outlook. That aspiration has been somewhat
weakened by the practice of having outside contractors prepare the EIS. Citizen’s Guide, supra note 57, at
5 (noting that many federal agencies have established internal offices dedicated to NEPA policy and
program oversight).
83.

Citizen’s Guide, supra note 57, at 17.

84. Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (May 24, 1977); see, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508
(2022) (CEQ's NEPA implementing regulations); Mandelker, supra note 49, at 2:9, 7:29; Citizen’s Guide,
supra note 57, at 6; Luther, supra note 51, at 9-10.
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F. Public Comment
The sponsoring agency ordinarily prepares a draft EIS, making it available
for public comment; the agency then responds to those comments before finalizing
the document.85 Unlike the original ACIS process, there is no mechanism for
transmitting an EIS (or an annual package) to Congress; the environmental process
is much more decentralized.
Federal agencies prepare thousands of Environmental Assessments and
hundreds of Environmental Impact Statements annually.86
In response to these procedures, a cottage industry of private scientific and
other consultants has arisen, with competing experts marshaled to prepare and
critique a draft EIS and to support or oppose any proposed action, based on differing
professional perspectives about the technical accuracy and completeness of the
analysis. Some critics complain about the danger of bias and the artificiality of this
emerging slice of the national economy, but it has surely helped to upgrade the state
of the art in environmental analysis.87

G. National Security
There is no general or categorical NEPA exception for national security or
defense-related projects.88 The EIS process has applied to programs involving, for
example, storage of nuclear missiles,89 testing nuclear weapons,90 destruction of

85. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1503.1, 1503.4, 1506.6 (2022); Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 7:23, 7:24, 7:26
(describing opportunities for public engagement on agencies’ environmental documents; comments can
come from federal, tribal, state, and local agencies, as well as the public); Citizen’s Guide, supra note 57,
at 17-21; Luther, supra note 51, at 23.
86. Citizen’s Guide, supra note 57, at 7. See, e.g., ENV'T PROT. AGENCY, Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) Database, https://cdxapps.epa.gov/cdx-enepa-II/public/action/eis/search (last visited Apr.
9, 2022); Dycus, supra note 55, at 14 (estimating 10,000-20,000 environmental assessments and about 450
EISs per year).
87. See Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 7:10, 10:37 (discussing the requirement that an EIS contain
factual data and scientific judgment).
88. Dycus, supra note 55, at 11-30 (presenting multiple applications of NEPA to defense activities);
Mandelker, supra note 49, § 5:15; Lakshman D. Guruswamy & Jason B. Aamodtt, Nuclear Arms Control:
The Environmental Dimension, 10 COLO. J. INT'L ENV’T L. & POL'Y 267, 309-10 (1999). But see McQueary
v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971) (suggesting national defense exemption for storage of chemical
and biological warfare agents). Regarding the danger of terrorist attacks, most courts have ruled that an
EIS need not evaluate the potential danger that future terrorism might impose against a proposed project.
Mandelker, supra note 49, at 8:54. But see San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n.,
449 F.3d 1016, 1034 (9th Cir. 2006).
89. See, e.g., Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Weinberger
v. Cath. Action of Haw., 454 U.S. 139 (1981).
90.

See Comm. for Nuclear Resp., Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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excess nuclear weapons pursuant to a treaty,91 and transporting chemical weapons.92
Occasionally, proponents of a project that carries great national importance have
advocated for a dedicated ad hoc statutory exemption from ordinary EIS duties.
However, those have been remarkably rare, and in almost every instance, concerted
study of the environmental aspects of a major federal weapons-related action has
turned out to be compatible with the decision-making timetable and outcomes.93
The question of security classification initially proved problematic for the
EIS process, but sufficient experience has now been gained so agencies, courts, and
outsiders have adapted. Now, when a document with classified information is
generated, selected portions, a separable annex, or the entire instrument can be
properly withheld from public view.94

91. See e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, Environmental Assessment for the Proposed Elimination of
Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles Pursuant to the INF Treaty (1988); CORPS OF ENGIN’RS,
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, Pershing Missiles, Elimination, Pueblo, Co., et al.: Finding of No Significant Impact, 53
Fed. Reg. 6189 (March 1, 1988).
92. See Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 758-61 (D. Haw. 1990) (holding that NEPA
did not apply to a presidential agreement with West Germany to transport nerve gas stored in West
Germany to a Pacific atoll for destruction but suggesting the impact statement may be needed for actions
taken abroad that affect this country or where there is a total lack of environmental assessment).
93. Mandelker, supra note 49, § 5:6 (listing statutes that provide full or partial exemption from
NEPA for particular agencies or projects); Dycus, supra note 55, at 21 (noting that 1988 Base Realignment
and Closure Act waived certain NEPA’s environmental review requirements); Citizen’s Guide, supra note
57, at 17 (describing FAST-41 legislation creating an expedited environmental review process for selected
projects); Stephen Dycus, NEPA Secrets, 2 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 300 (1993) (quoting then-Secretary of
Defense Dick Cheney saying that “[d]efense and the environment is not an either/or proposition. To
choose between them is impossible in this real world of serious defense threats and genuine environmental
concerns.”) [hereinafter Dycus, Secrets]; see also 11 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL
§ 724.3(g), https://fam.state.gov/fam/11fam/11fam0720.html(establishing “Circular 175” procedures for
U.S. government agencies to seek authorization to initiate or conclude treaty negotiations and specifying
that “[a]n action memorandum dealing with an agreement that has a potential for adverse environmental
impact should contain a statement indicating whether the agreement will significantly affect the quality
of the human environment.”).
94. Dycus, supra note 55, at 24-26 (discussing secret environmental reviews); see also Dycus,
Secrets, supra note 93, at 308 (noting numerous NEPA cases that dealt with classified materials); 40
C.F.R. § 1507.3(f)(1) (2022) (outlining how agencies should proceed when dealing with classified
information); Weinberger v. Cath. Action of Haw., 454 U.S. 139, 146-47 (1981) (litigation over EIS
related to classified information regarding facilities for storage of nuclear weapons); Mandelker, supra note
49, § 5:15; William R. Mendelsohn, In Camera Review of Classified Environmental Impact Statements: A
Threatened Opportunity?, 23 B.C. ENV’T AFF. L. REV. 679, 695-97 (1996); F.L. McChesney, Nuclear
Weapons and “Secret” Impact Statements: High Court Applies FOIA Exemptions to EIS Rules, 12 ENV’T L. REP.
10007 (1982), https://elr.info/sites/default/files/articles/12.10007.htm; Environmental Oversight of
Classified Federal Research: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Gov’t Affs., 104th Cong. (March 12, 1996),
https://sgp.fas.org/othergov/gao.html (statement by Bernice Steinhardt, Assoc. Dir., Energy, Res., and
Scis., Res., Community, and Econ. Dev. Div.). To facilitate work on classified documents, the
Environmental Protection Agency has routinely had on staff an EIS reviewer with high-level security
clearances. Personal email correspondence with the author on September 22, 2021, from Dinah Bear,
former General Counsel, Council on Environmental Quality and Anne Norton Miller, former Director
of the Office of Federal Activities, EPA.
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Executive Order 12114 of 1979 supplements the statutory scheme regarding
“Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions.”95 It requires a proponent
agency to prepare suitable public documentation regarding U.S.-based activities that
may significantly affect the quality of the human environment either in the “global
commons” (areas beyond any country’s national jurisdiction) or, in certain
circumstances, inside a foreign country.96

H. Judicial Review
A critical feature of the EIS process – and a decisive difference with the
original ACIS program – is the possibility for judicial review to test the adequacy of
the agency’s study and documentation. Although the statute does not explicitly
provide for access to court, this recourse has been a prominent feature of NEPA case
law since the earliest days, and it has generated an unabating flood of litigation.97
Sometimes the proceedings have become intensely politicized, and sufficiently
protracted and expensive as to burden all the participants and to delay indefinitely
any resolution of the fate of the proposed program.98 Sometimes, federal legislation
has provided relief from stringent judicial review.99
95. Exec. Order No. 12,114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (Jan. 4, 1979); see also Mandelker, supra note 49, §
5:20; Envt’l Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (applying the executive order to
U.S. activities in Antarctica).
96. The executive order requires an environmental assessment or other documentation, rather than
a full EIS, and it contains several important exemptions. Unlike the NEPA statute, this executive order
does not permit judicial review. Exec. Order 12,114, supra note 95, §§ 2-3 (actions included), 2-4 (types
of documents to prepare), 2-5 (exemptions), 3-1 (unavailability of judicial review); Mandelker, supra note
49, at § 5:20.
NEPA’s statutory applicability to federal actions that carry extraterritorial environmental effects has
been controversial. See Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 5:18, 5:19 (remarking that “it is fairly clear that
NEPA applies to actions in the global commons where no nation has sovereignty.”), 5:21; see Dycus, supra
note 55, at 26-30; Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Consejo de Desarrollo
Economico de Mexicali, AC v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1234-36 (D. Nev. 2006), vacated and
remanded, 482 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2007); Dycus, Secrets, supra note 93, at 313-14.
97. See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1129
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (affirming judicial review of federal agencies’ compliance with NEPA’s EIS
requirement); Mandelker, supra note 49, §§1:5, 2:4, 4 (discussing NEPA litigation); Luther, supra note
51, at 1-2 (noting that no federal agency has enforcement authority for NEPA, so judicial review is the
best available recourse).
98. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.10(2022) (regulation establishing time limits on environmental reviews,
providing that an environmental assessment should ordinarily be completed within one year and an EIS
within two years); see Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 2:17, 7:3 (discussing efforts to streamline the EIS
procedures); David E. Adelman & Robert L. Glicksman, Presidential and Judicial Politics in Environmental
Litigation, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 3-4 (2018); Richard J. Lazarus, The Power of Persuasion Before and Within the
Supreme Court: Reflections on NEPA’s Zero for Seventeen Record at the High Court, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 231,
232 (2012); Luther, supra note 51, at 9, 26-31.
99. Mandelker, supra note 49, § 2:29 (discussing legislation streamlining ordinary NEPA
procedures for selected highway projects, including mitigating the opportunities for judicial review);
Luther, supra note 51, at 29-31 (describing efforts to expedite the NEPA process).
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Occasionally, a key early procedural hurdle in the EIS litigation has been
the question of “standing to sue.” The legal issue has been determining the
circumstances under which aggrieved individuals or organized groups of
environmental activists are deemed to present a cognizable “injury in fact” which
would entitle them to challenge the proposed major federal action.100

I. Conclusion
NEPA, and the associated administrative, legislative, and judicial
maelstrom surrounding it, have irrevocably changed U.S. culture. Opponents still
rail against the whole EIS process, blaming it for blocking or delaying projects or
making them more cumbersome and expensive. Critics have vigorously challenged
the concept behind the statute and the execution of its mandates. Nevertheless, this
innovative law has endured, and detractors now acknowledge that environmental
assessment is inevitably going to be a staple part of any big project. Even NEPA’s
proponents would not claim that the legislation has achieved all of the goals
articulated for it in 1969, but over fifty years, the EIS has successfully insinuated
itself into American law and practice.101

III.OTHER TYPES OF IMPACT STATEMENTS
NEPA’s success has inspired legions of copycats -- in U.S., foreign, and
international law -- adapting the concept of formalized impact assessment to facilitate
an organized social response to a diverse array of challenges. Some of these knockoffs do not adopt the formal moniker of “impact assessment,” and some of them get
pretty far afield from this Article’s central concerns, but this section surveys some of
the leading exemplars. These illustrate that it is not something special about
environmental law that makes this mechanism work.102 Moreover, they help
demonstrate the recurrent value of the “close look” strategy in making hard public
policy decisions, and they suggest some features that might be profitably borrowed
for a revived ACIS process.

A. U.S. State Legislation
The most overt replication of the federal NEPA has been the enactment, in
sixteen U.S. states of corresponding laws that apply similar study and documentation

100. See Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 4:9, 4:18, 4:19, 12.8 (discussing standing to sue under various
states’ versions of NEPA).
101. See Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 11:2 (presenting views of NEPA’s detractors and defenders),
11:5 (discussing academic writing that evaluates NEPA’s effectiveness).
102. See Mandelker, supra note 49, § 2:25 (discussing environmental review requirements in
numerous other U.S. statutes).
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requirements to major actions proposed by that state’s government.103 These “little
NEPAs” vary considerably, with California’s being the most aggressive.104

B. Other Countries
Daniel R. Mandelker has observed that “Environmental assessment is an
American innovation that has spread worldwide.”105 By one count, at least 183
countries have mimicked in their own domestic law some variant of the concept of
mandatory pre-decisional rigorous environmental impact assessment of proposed
government activities.106 Prominent examples include members of the European
Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada, each of which incorporates its own
variations and special features.107

C. International Law
Treaties offer several expressions of the NEPA procedural strategy of
requiring authorities to take a pre-decisional “hard look” at a contentious
environmental or other issue, without necessarily mandating a thumb on either side
of the scale regarding the ultimate substantive outcome. Three examples are most
illuminating, beginning with one that is closest in character to an EIS and
culminating with one that bears similarities to an ACIS.
The first illustration comes from the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS),108 which serves grandly as a “constitution for the oceans,” in

103. See COUNCIL ON ENV’T. QUALITY, States and Local Jurisdictions with NEPA-Like
Environmental Planning Requirements, https://ceq.doe.gov/laws-regulations/states.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2022) (linking to state and local laws echoing NEPA).
104. Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 1:7,12 (generally discussing state environmental assessment
laws), 12.3 (California), 12.4 (New York).
105. Mandelker, supra note 49, § 13:1.
106. Tseming Yang, The Emergence of the Environmental Impact Assessment Duty as a Global Legal
Norm and General Principle of Law, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 525, 527 (2019); COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY,
InternationalEnvironmentalImpactAssessment,https://ceq.doe.gov/get-involved/international_impact_ass
essment.html (listing countries that maintain some NEPA-like requirements for environmental
assessment);
NETH.
COMMISSION
FOR
ENV’T
ASSESSMENT,
Why
ESIA/SEA?,
https://www.eia.nl/en/our-work/why-esiasea (last visited Apr. 9, 2022) (presenting interactive map
showing increase over time in national laws requiring environmental assessment). See generally, INT’L
ASS’N FOR IMPACT ASSESSMENT, About IAIA, https://iaia.org/about.php (last visited Apr. 9, 2022)
(describing the work of this global network of diverse professionals promoting the use of organized impact
assessment tools for informed public policy decision-making).
107. Mandelker, supra note 49, § 13; see Council Directive 85/337/EEC, of June 27, 1985 on the
Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and Private Projects on the Environment, 1985 O.J. (L 175)
40, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:51993PC0575&rid=8.
108. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. There are 168 parties to this treaty; the United States is not a party. Law of the
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regulating human activities on, under, and over the global waterways. It deals
comprehensively with enterprises such as fishing, mining, and navigation, all of
which have profound environmental consequences. Accordingly, UNCLOS article
206 specifies:
When States have reasonable grounds for believing that planned
activities under their jurisdiction or control may cause substantial
pollution of or significant and harmful changes to the marine
environment, they shall, as far as practicable, assess the potential
effects of such activities on the marine environment and shall
communicate reports of the results of such assessments in the
manner provided in article 205.109
Accompanying provisions require that states shall, “endeavour, as far as
practicable, directly or through the competent international organizations, to
observe, measure, evaluate and analyse, by recognized scientific methods, the risks or
effects of pollution of the marine environment”110 and that states “shall publish
reports of the results obtained pursuant to article 204 or provide such reports at
appropriate intervals to the competent international organizations, which should
make them available to all States.”111 All these provisions resonate with NEPA,
which had been enacted shortly before the UNCLOS negotiations commenced.
Second, veering away from the focus on environmental issues, a rather
different sort of comparison comes from the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty.112 It attempts
to regulate the burgeoning international commercial market for eight categories of
major conventional weapons (including tanks, combat aircraft, and warships, as well
as small arms and light weapons).113 In view of the many legitimate purposes that
international traffic in these armaments can serve, as well as the potential for
aggravating local arms races and human rights violations, the negotiating states could
not agree to categorically prohibit or restrict the transfers,114 nor to create some sort

Sea,UNITEDNATIONSTREATYCOLLECTION,https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=T
REATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en (last visited Apr. 9, 2022).
109. UNCLOS, supra note 108, art. 206.
110. UNCLOS, supra note 108, art. 204.
111. UNCLOS, supra note 108, art. 205.
112. Arms Trade Treaty, June 3, 2013, 3013 U.N.T.S, https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyperimages/file/TheArmsTradeTreaty1/TheArmsTradeTreaty.pdf [hereinafter ATT]. As of March 2022,
there are 111 parties to this treaty; the United States is not a party. Arms Trade Treaty, UNITED NATIONS
TREATYCOLLECTION,https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XX
VI/XXVI-8.en.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2022).
113. ATT, supra note 112, art. 2.
114. In some circumstances, the treaty does directly prohibit a proposed arms transfer: if the
transfer would violate U.N. Security Council sanctions, if it would violate a treaty, or if the weapons

Winter 2022

Un-repeal: Reviving the Arms Control Impact Statements

287

of international body that would be authorized to permit, ban, or limit them. Instead,
the treaty’s key article requires that each party contemplating an arms export:
shall, in an objective and non-discriminatory manner, taking into
account relevant factors, including information provided by the
importing State in accordance with Article 8 (1), assess the
potential that the conventional arms or items:
a. would contribute to or undermine peace and
security;
b. could be used to:
i. commit or facilitate a serious
violation of international humanitarian
law;
ii. commit or facilitate a serious
violation of international human rights
law;
iii. commit or facilitate an act
constituting
an
offence
under
international conventions or protocols
relating to terrorism to which the
exporting State is a Party; or
iv. commit or facilitate an act
constituting
an
offence
under
international conventions or protocols
relating to transnational organized crime
to which the exporting State is a Party.115
The state contemplating an export makes a unilateral judgment about these
variables, but there are bottom-line legal consequences: “If, after conducting this
assessment and considering available mitigating measures, the exporting State Party
determines that there is an overriding risk of any of the negative consequences in
paragraph 1, the exporting State Party shall not authorize the export.”116
In undertaking this independent assessment, the exporting state is required
to consider “whether there are measures that could be undertaken to mitigate risks
identified”117 above, and it “shall make available appropriate information about the
authorization in question, upon request, to the importing State Party.”118 If, after a

would be used in the commission of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity. ATT, supra note
112, art. 6.
115. ATT, supra note 112, art. 7.1.
116. ATT, supra note 112, art. 7.3.
117. ATT, supra note 112, art. 7.2
118. ATT, supra note 112, art. 7.6.
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party has authorized a particular export, it “becomes aware of new relevant
information, it is encouraged to reassess the authorization after consultations, if
appropriate, with the importing State.”119
Again, in a manner comparable to NEPA, the Arms Trade Treaty does not
directly prohibit the arms sales in question here; instead, the strategy is to require
the putative exporter to think in good faith about the proposal in a serious, organized
way, to take all relevant factors into account, and to document its choices.120 Critics
complain that this “self-judging” aspect of the ATT has severely undercut the treaty’s
effectiveness. Exporting states have routinely found it easy enough to justify all their
contemplated international transfers; the treaty’s mechanisms have not, in practice,
greatly inhibited illegitimate or unwise weapons traffic.121 But, again, the point of
the comparison is to suggest that a legal requirement for rigorous, wide-ranging
evaluation can be applicable even in circumstances where weapons policies and
defense priorities are at stake.
A third illustration, again quite distant from environmentalism, is found in
art. 36 of the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.122 It
establishes an obligation to assess any new weapon, prior to its use in combat, for
consistency with the law of war.

119. ATT, supra note 112, art. 7.7.
120. See also the domestic U.S. law on international arms sales, 22 U.S.C § 2765 (requiring annual
reports to Congress justifying international arms sales, including an analysis of “the United States national
security considerations involved in expected sales or licensed commercial exports to each country, an
analysis of the relationship between anticipated sales to each country and arms control efforts concerning
such country and an analysis of the impact of such anticipated sales on the stability of the region that
includes such country”). Id. at (a)(3).
121. CONTROL ARMS, ATT MONITOR REPORT 2020 16-17 (Daniel Mack, Carina Solmirano, &
Katherine Young eds., 2020), https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/EN_ATT_MonitorReport-2020_Online.pdf (critiquing arms transfers where the weapons were later used to commit
atrocities); AMNESTY INT’L & PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES, “No Credible Evidence” — Canada’s Flawed
Analysis
of
Arms
Exports
to
Saudi
Arabia
(2021),
https://ploughshares.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2021/08/NoCredibleEvidence_EN.pdf (critiquing Canada’s self-assessment of its
compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty); Dan Sabbagh, UK Authorised L1.4bn of Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia
AfterExportsResumed,THEGUARDIAN(Feb.9,2021),https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/09/
uk-authorised-14bn-of-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-after-exports-resumed; Rayhan Uddin, Saudi Arabia
Arms Sales: Which Countries Are Still Exporting?, MIDDLE EAST EYE (Feb. 19, 2021),
https://www.middleeasteye.net/saudi-uae-coalition-arms-sales-country-breakdown;
William
Pons,
Defeating the Object and Purpose of the Arms Trade Treaty: An Analysis of Recent U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi
Arabia, 35 AM. UNIV. INT’L L. REV. 133 (2019).
122. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), adopted June 8, 1977, art. 36,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.34_AP-IEN.pdf [hereinafter AP1]. There are 118 parties to this treaty; the United States is not a party. Protocol
Additional,UNTREATIES,https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800f3586&cla
ng=_en (last visited Apr. 9, 2022).
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In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new
weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party
is under an obligation to determine whether its employment
would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol
or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High
Contracting Party.123
Although the United States is not a party to this treaty, internal U.S. law
has long established a parallel obligation for legal review prior to the procurement or
deployment of any new weapon. The standard protocol for this legal review
generally adheres to the international criteria, asking whether the weapon’s intended
use is calculated to cause superfluous injury; whether the weapon is inherently
indiscriminate; and whether the weapon falls within a class of weapons that has been
specifically prohibited. In addition, the analysis may identify particular measures
that should be adopted in order to help ensure compliance with law of war
obligations, such as advising about special training programs or about the
promulgation of specific military doctrine or rules of engagement related to the new
weapon.124
While it is impossible to determine how in-depth these internal legal
reviews have generally been (or to know how many systems have flunked the
analysis), this type of mandatory assessment partially resonates with the mixed law
and policy appraisal of an EIS. The comparison illustrates the viability of a
procedure that requires a deliberative pause, insisting upon a mandatory careful
review, even of a weapons-related program that has proceeded quite far down the
developmental path.

D. Miscellaneous Assessments
Finally, it is noteworthy that the vocabulary and format of formalized
“impact assessment” have generally caught the zeitgeist of modern U.S. society, with
NEPA’s conceptual structure being adapted in multiple, diverse contexts far removed
from environmentalism.
For example, federal agencies have long been required to undertake a
Regulatory Impact Analysis prior to the issuance of new administrative regulations,
to promote a rational process for collecting, organizing, and analyzing data about the
123. AP1, supra note 122, at 21; see also INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, A Guide to the Legal
Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol
I of 1977 (January 2006), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/irrc_864_icrc_gene va.pdf.
124. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 5000.01, THE DEF. ACQUISITION SYSTEM § sec. 1.2.v
(2020); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 2060.01, IMPLEMENTATION OF, AND COMPLIANCE WITH,
ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, (2020); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL JUNE 2015 33739 (2016); MICHAEL MEIER, U.S. DELEGATION STATEMENT ON “WEAPON REVIEWS”, (APR. 13, 2016),
https://geneva.usmission.gov/2016/04/13/u-s-statement-at-the-ccw-informal-meeting-of-experts-onlethal-autonomous-weapons-systems/.

290

Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law

Vol. 11:2

possible impacts and burdens of various new policy options, and to promote
evidence-based public policy decision-making.125 Health Impact Assessment is
defined as "a combination of procedures, methods, and tools by which a policy,
program, or project may be judged as to its potential effects on thehealth of a
population, and thedistributionof those effects within the population."126 A Small
Business Economic Impact Statement is a public document, required by some U.S.
states, to reveal how a government agency has formally evaluated the costs of a
proposed new regulation on small businesses, and how those costs can be mitigated.127
The U.S. government must file a Competitive Impact Statement to accompany any
consent judgment in an antitrust case, to explain to the public the case and the nature
of the proposed resolution.128 A Disparity Impact Statement will “measure and
inform how different services will be delivered to, and received by, underserved
groups within the general population,” thereby clarifying existing inequalities and
plans to ensure fair access and quality of service.129 An Agricultural Impact
Statement is required in some states when a public project involves acquiring or
significantly affecting farmland (more than five acres.)130
As a thousand different forms of impact statements bloom, there can be no
guaranty that a formalized, fact-based, all-encompassing analytical procedure,
accompanied by public disclosure and debate, can automatically dramatically improve
public policy. But there is certainly evidence of widespread support for the tactic,
and diverse commitments to implementing it in all sorts of venues.131 The next
125. Exec. Order No. 12,866, Regulatory Planning and Review, September 30, 1993, 58 Fed. Reg.
51735-44 (1993); OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLAN. AND EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
AND HUM. SERVS., GUIDELINES FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (2016); OFF. OF INFO. AND
REGUL. AFFS., OFF. OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, REGUL. IMPACT ANALYSIS: A PRIMER (2011).
126. WORLD HEALTH ORG., EUR. CTR. FOR HEALTH POL’Y, HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT:
MAIN CONCEPTS AND SUGGESTED APPROACH 4 (1999); WORLD HEALTH ORG., Health Impact
Assessment, https://www.who.int/health-topics/health-impact-assessment#tab=tab_1 (last visited Mar. 27,
2022).
127. See WASH. GOVERNOR’S OFF. FOR REG. INNOVATION AND ASSISTANCE, Attorney General’s
RFA Guidance, Small Business Economic Impact Statements – Frequently Asked Questions,
https://www.oria.wa.gov/site/alias__oria/934/Regulatory-Fairness-Act-Support.aspx (last visited Apr. 9,
2022).
128. Section 2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b).
129. POLICY RESEARCH ASSOCS., Creating Disparity Impact Statements to Optimize Early Diversion
in Reducing Disparities (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.prainc.com/disparity-impact-statements-earlydiversion/.
130. WIS. DEPT. OF AGRIC., TRADE AND CONSUMER PROT., Agricultural Impact Statements (AIS),
https://datcp.wi.gov/Pages/Programs_Services/AgriculturalImpactStatements.aspx.
131. As another point of comparison, the Department of State annually prepares a variety of
detailed analytic reports on vital public policy issues, such as various countries’ human rights practices,
sponsorship of terrorism, and compliance with arms control treaties. These are not “impact statements”
in the sense addressed in this Article, and they evaluate the behaviors of other countries, rather than of
the United States itself. But they do illustrate the heuristic value of rigorous, fact-based analysis and of
public presentation of the results. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,
https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/ (last visited May. 13,
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section of this Article, therefore, turns to the possibility of re-establishing a cognate
mechanism in the one field where this format of rigorous analysis and documentation
was previously applied with a conspicuous lack of success. It will attempt to marshal
the lessons learned from environmental and other impact statements and argue in
support of a revivified Arms Control Impact Statement procedure.

IV.A NEW ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENT
This Article proposes a new ACIS process, which Congress should
establish, presumably through new comprehensive federal legislation, based upon the
several partial precedents addressed above.132 This section is organized around a
series of questions that will have to be resolved in the development of such a revived
ACIS program, based upon the successes and shortcomings of NEPA, the original
ACIS, and other similar schemes.

A. What Subjects Should an ACIS Address?
The first significant question is which sorts of proposed governmental
programs, activities, and other decisions should require the development of a new
ACIS. In other words, what should be the scope of a new statute’s mandatory
oversight?
The two primary precedents differ in important ways here. NEPA tersely
addresses “major federal actions,” with no further statutory elaboration; it has been
left to the Council on Environmental Quality and the courts to define the contours
of that mandate, with the result being a very wide remit. Of course, EISs have been
prepared for significant construction, engineering, and licensing projects, but some
form of environmental documentation has also been filed for activities such as the
negotiation and conclusion of treaties that limit nuclear weapons.133 In contrast, the
original ACIS legislation applied to three designated categories: nuclear weapons;
expensive weapons; and a catch-all category of other weapons that the director of

2022); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, State Sponsors of Terrorism, https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-ofterrorism/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2022); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2021 Adherence to and Compliance With Arms
Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (Apr. 15, 2021),
https://www.state.gov/2021-adherence-to-and-compliance-with-arms-control-nonproliferation-anddisarmament-agreements-and-commitments/.
132. It could also be possible to establish important portions of this proposal through executive
branch action, without requiring legislation, at least as an initial matter, but further consideration of that
procedural route is beyond the scope of this Article.
133. DAVID A. KOPLOW, BY FIRE AND ICE: DISMANTLING CHEMICAL WEAPONS WHILE
PRESERVING THE ENVIRONMENT 89-90 (1997) (describing environmental documentation for arms
control treaties).
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ACDA believed “may have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament
policy or negotiations.”134
This Article proposes a broad initial scope for the new iteration of ACIS,
to sweep into the program a wide array of activities, subject to the possibility (noted
infra) that some of them could be disposed of in relatively abbreviated fashion.
Starting at the highest level, the reach of the inquiry should extend beyond the
original ACIS’s focus on “arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations”135
to explicitly embrace a full spectrum of issues and concerns. This should include
arms control, disarmament, proliferation, national and global security, crisis and arms
race stability, deterrence, counterterrorism, U.S. military and intelligence budgets,
“confidence-building measures,” existing and prospective treaties and non-legally
binding regimes, and more.136
In particular, major weapons programs (involving both nuclear and nonnuclear weapons, and implicating more or less than $250 million) could have
significant arms control impact, as could programs that are not directly or
immediately related to weapons, but that involve “dual-use” technology that could
be rapidly adapted for warlike applications.137 Aside from U.S. government
procurement activities, international sales and other transfers of major weapons
should be studied in similar fashion, along with proposed decisions to alter the terms
of international cooperative regimes that coordinate various states’ export control

134. Sec. 36, supra note 4, (a)(3). Note that for this catch-all category, an ACIS is required only if
the National Security Council concurred with the ACDA director’s judgment that the program would
have a significant impact on arms control policy and negotiations. Id. (b)(2)(B); see Lall, supra note 5, at
1-3 (suggesting that the true objective should be to assess a program’s consistency with arms control (and
non-proliferation, etc.), not necessarily its consistency with the current U.S. government policy concerning
arms control (and non-proliferation, etc.) Of course, those factors will overlap, but if the current
government policy is to oppose meaningful arms control, it could endorse unwise weapon programs).
135. Sec. 36, supra note 4, (b)(2).
136. For convenience, this diverse set of interests can still be referred to by a catch-all term such as
“arms control,” and the familiar caption of “ACIS” can still be used.
137. The Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, determined in 1978 that the original
ACIS statute did not require an ACIS for new technology programs that were not designed or intended
to be applied as weapons, even if that technology might foreseeably be later turned to weapons uses.
Memorandum Op. by the Dep’t of Justice Off. Of Legal Couns. for the Gen. Couns., Dep’t of Energy
78-12 (Feb. 27, 1978). This statutory standard was later amended, to apply the ACIS requirement even
for technologies for which the potential weapons applications had not yet ripened. Pub. L. No. 95-338, §
2(B), 92 Stat. 458 (1978) (substituting “technology with potential military application or weapons
systems” for “weapons systems or technology.”); see also 1979 Hearings, supra note 7, at 7, 17 (statement
of Barry M. Blechman, observing that the FY 1980 ACIS package included, for the first time, a discussion
of a non-weapon technology, inertial confinement fusion; for FY 1981, several non-weapon technologies
were included); CRS 1979 Analysis, supra note 7, at 133, 149 (discussing ACIS consideration of nonweapons and dual-capability programs of the Department of Energy, such as inertial confinement fusion.);
cf. Scis. Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, supra note 66 (holding that an EIS was
required for the development of a liquid metal fast breeder reactor, even though the program was still in
the research phase).
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regulations for weapons and associated components, services, and technologies.138 In
some instances, non-hardware innovations, such as the development of new military
“tactics, techniques, and procedures” (TTPs)139 and the training of foreign military
units and individuals would also be relevant.140
The concept of new ACISs would require careful analysis of activities that
might be expected to have a “positive” effect on arms control and disarmament,141 as
well as those that might threaten to move in an adverse direction. The rigorous
comparison of alternatives (including the “no action” alternative)142 could also
illuminate a broader range of options that might be pursued. In this spirit, proposals
to initiate or conclude (or not) the negotiation of a new arms control treaty or a nonlegally binding regime, such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran,
would be evaluated in this way, as well as proposals to amend or withdraw from such
accords. Likewise, programs or agreements designed to create new surveillance
technologies and procedures (to enable better verification of compliance with current
and future arms control regimes) should be subject to an ACIS. Similarly, the
procedure should also apply to any reverse program intended to enhance the
concealment ability to escape effective international monitoring.143
138. See ATT, supra note 112; see also Daryl G. Kimball, U.S. Reinterprets MTCR Rules, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY (Sept. 2020) (reporting Donald Trump Administration’s announcement of unilateral
reinterpretation of rules of the Missile Technology Control Regime (a leading mechanism for coordinating
export control rules among high-tech countries) in order to expedite sales of unmanned aerial vehicles);
ARMS CONTROL ASSOC., The Wassenaar Arrangement at a Glance, Arms Control Association Fact Sheet (Dec.
2017), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/wassenaar (discussing non-legally-binding mechanism for
coordinating exports of weapons-related materials); GOV’T OF AUSTL., The Australia Group,
https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/theaustraliagroupnet/site/en/index.html (last visited Apr.
1, 2022) (describing informal forum for coordination of participating states’ export control restrictions on
chemical and biological weapons materials).
139. The House committee report on the original ACIS legislation specified that the requirement
would apply even to “items of a ‘seminal’ nature, such as major philosophical or doctrinal changes in
defense posture or new weapons concepts.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-281, at 6 (1975); CRS 1979 Analysis, supra
note 7, at 49, 63, 74-76 (analyzing the arms control implications of adopting a “launch on warning” strategy
for U.S. nuclear missiles).
140. Alex Horton, U.S. Military Once Trained Colombians Implicated in Haiti Assassination Plot,
Pentagon Says, WASH. POST (July 15, 2021) https://www.washingtonpost.com/nationalsecurity/2021/07/15/colombia-haiti-us-military/; Mark Mazzetti,Julian E. BarnesandMichael LaForgia,
Saudi Operatives Who Killed Khashoggi Received Paramilitary Training in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2021)
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/22/us/politics/khashoggi-saudi-kill-team-us-training.html; RICHARD
F. GRIMMETT & MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30532, U.S. ARMY SCHOOL OF THE
AMERICAS: BACKGROUND AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS (2001).
141. See The Arms Control Impact Statement Process, ARMS CONTROL TODAY 5 (July/Aug. 1976)
(recommending that an ACIS could usefully analyze positive arms control developments, such as
improved monitoring capabilities); cf ATT, supra note 112, art. 7.1(a) (requiring an exporter to assess the
potential that the proposed transfer “would contribute to or undermine peace and security”) (emphasis
added).
142. Mandelker, supra note 49, § 10:32 (discussing evaluation of the no action alternative).
143. See, e.g., Treaty on Open Skies, Mar. 24, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-37 (1992) (under the
heading, “Basic Elements of Open Skies”). This treaty allows parties to conduct unrestricted aerial
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Writ large, the assignment is to cast a critical, intellectually honest eye at
the 360-degree effects of proposed federal actions on the whole family of arms
control and national security policy, negotiations, and future prospects. The key is
to consider the long-term dynamic effects of the government’s choices today.144

B. When Should an ACIS Be Done?
The second question is when, and how frequently during a program’s
lifecycle an impact assessment should be undertaken. Again, the two primary models
differ sharply. Critical to the NEPA concept is the requirement to initiate the
environmental assessment at the outset of a decision-making process so that the
results can be factored into the government’s evolving choices. Ordinarily, there is
only one EIS for a particular project, unless changed circumstances require a revisit.
In contrast, the original ACIS studies were undertaken much later – typically after
the weapons procurement program was approaching maturity – and the executive
branch kept the program under annual re-appraisal. This led to some of the annual
statements becoming basically pro forma repetition of prior analyses.
The proposal here draws upon both models, requiring two ACIS
submissions of somewhat different character. The first would occur at the outset of
the program when the government is trying to decide whether to initiate research on
a new weapon concept, or whether to undertake negotiation of a new treaty. The
second submission would be required when the project is nearing completion and the
decision is whether to proceed with production and deployment of the weapon, or
overflight of neighboring states, employing sophisticated multi-spectral sensors in order to monitor
military-related activity, as a safeguard against surprise attacks. The United States and Russia have
recently withdrawn from the treaty. Open Skies Consultative Commission, Conference of States Parties to
the Open Skies Treaty discusses U.S. intent to withdraw from the Treaty, ORG. FOR SEC. AND COOP. IN EUR.
(July 7, 2020), https://www.osce.org/oscc/456646; Conference of States Parties to the Open Skies Treaty
discusses Russian Federation's intent to withdraw from the Treaty, ORG. FOR SEC. AND COOP. IN EUR. (July
20, 2021), https://www.osce.org/oscc/493411 (website of the implementing organization for the Open
Skies Treaty, with pages detailing U.S. and Russian intent to withdraw from the treaty); Arms Control
Association,
The
Open
Skies
Treaty
at
a
Glance
(June
2021),
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/openskies; Patrick Tucker, Why Open Skies Is an Old Fashioned
Treaty Worth Keeping, DEF. ONE (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/10/whyopen-skies-old-fashioned-treaty-worth-keeping/160496/. In a similar vein, the ACIS should evaluate not
only a program’s consistency with current arms control policy, but also its compatibility with possible future
arms control undertakings. For example, if a proposed new missile could carry both nuclear and
conventional warheads, it might offer substantial financial efficiencies, but that interoperability could
frustrate any future attempts to negotiate international restraints on the system, because it might be
impossible to verify the armaments on an individual missile.
144. Cf. Lauren Woods, The Top US Diplomat on Arms Control Commits to “Values-Based Security
Partnerships” — Here’s How to Do That, JUST SEC. (July 30, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/77644/
the-top-us-diplomat-on-arms-control-commits-to-values-based-security-partnerships-heres-how-to-dothat/ (asserting that a governmental “focus on values and effectiveness would be a deeply needed
correction to the current trajectory of U.S. security cooperation, which has largely failed to weigh the
human rights and security risks of assistance to foreign security forces” and has wrongly prioritized shortterm tactical goals over longer-term diplomatic and human rights aims).
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whether to sign a nearly-final international agreement.145 A new or supplemental
ACIS should be explored if something important changes later in the program’s life
cycle – either a significant change in the weapon (such as its cost, the numbers to be
procured or transferred abroad, or the way the weapon is to be used) or a change in
the international political situation (such as an alteration in the nature of a foreign
adversary or partner state).146 In addition, there should also be a mechanism for
keeping an eye on evolving programs that have passed the first ACIS milestone, but
have not yet arrived at the second. If important modifications are being made that
could indelibly affect the future course of the project, then they should be subject to
review before it becomes too late to undo their effects. But there would not be an
annual ACIS for any program.147

C. What Should Be the Scope of an ACIS?
Once it is determined that the new ACIS process should be triggered, what
exactly should the assessment and documentation address? Of course, this issue is
somewhat indeterminate. The appropriate scope of an ACIS will inevitably depend
upon its subject, as some types of programs and projects will require bespoke foci for
the research and analysis. But more broadly, this question goes to the heart of the
ACIS process by implicating the requirement for a broad-based, well-informed, and
skeptical “hard look” at the government’s proposed action.
The starting point is that the new ACIS would be regarded as essentially
“procedural,” in the same way as an EIS and the original ACIS.148 That is, this
process does not dictate or constrain the substantive decisions about whether to
proceed with the proposed program or activity – it merely makes those decisions
more informed and more public. Other laws such as treaties, statutes, regulations,
and other authorities do impose more or less rigid substantive limits on weapons and
related undertakings, and the ACIS process would not displace or supplement them.
The United States would still be obligated to comply with the existing and evolving
corpus of its international law commitments regarding, for example, constraints on

145. This two-step sequence is somewhat similar to the weapons review process under Additional
Protocol 1, art. 36 and under comparable domestic U.S. law. AP1, supra, note 122 text accompanying note
123. It is also reminiscent of the two-step mechanism established under the “Circular 175” procedure in
U.S. law, requiring a formal documentation of authority to initiate a treaty negotiation, and subsequently
of authority to conclude and sign the agreement. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Circular 175 Procedure,
https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/c175/index.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
146. See Mandelker, supra note 49, at (discussing preparation of a supplemental EIS when there
has been a substantial change in circumstances); ATT, supra note 112, art. 7.7 (providing that “If, after an
authorization has been granted, an exporting State Party becomes aware of new relevant information, it is
encouraged to reassess the authorization after consultations, if appropriate, with the importing State.”).
147. See 1979 Hearings, supra note 7, at 3,8 (statement of Barry M. Blechman, questioning the
requirement for annual ACIS on each program).
148. Supra note 52.
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nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.149 Conversely, the new ACIS would not
compel the United States to honor any of the international accords that it has
decided, in the exercise of national sovereignty, not to join, such as the widelyaccepted treaties on anti-personnel land mines, cluster munitions, or the abolition of
nuclear weapons.150
The essential feature of an impact analysis is to require the leaders and their
support staffs to structure the decision-making process in a rigorous, even-handed
way, not relying solely upon the proponent’s druthers, the bureaucracy’s momentum,
or the boss’s seat-of-the-pants instincts. They would be required to adopt a longterm perspective, anticipating how other key actors (including allies, adversaries, and
others) might dynamically respond to the proposed U.S. action over time, and what
the likely implications of those action/reaction cycles might be. They would have to
consider deeply – not just as a throw-away debating point – the counterarguments
and the viable alternatives to the preferred course of action.151
The new ACIS would require in-depth analysis, writing the evaluations
with care, and citing evidence. The process would have to be interdisciplinary,
consulting, as appropriate, the perspectives of political science, foreign relations,
economics, game theory, military science, law, history, futurology, diplomacy,
natural sciences, and more. The government would also be required at the end of
the process to articulate the reasons for its decision and explain its rationale.152
Unlike the original ACIS – and like the EIS – the revised ACIS would not
require presentation of a definitive bottom-line judgment that the proposed program
was or was not consistent with current U.S. policies, practices, obligations, and goals.
Instead, the documents would simply present the relevant facts and analyses, teeing

149. See Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, U.S.-Russ., Apr. 8, 2010, T.I.A.S. No. 11-205 (entered into force Feb. 5, 2011); Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, T.I.A.S. No. 97-525 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997); Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583 (entered into force Mar. 26, 1975).
150. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211 (entered into force Mar. 1,
1999) [hereinafter the Ottawa Convention]; Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dec. 3, 2008, 2688
U.N.T.S. 39 (entered into force Aug. 1, 2010); Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Sept. 20,
2017, 57 I.L.M. 350 (entered into force Jan. 22, 2021).
151. Cf. Mandelker, supra note 49, at 748-54 (discussing a prior CEQ requirement that agencies
undertake a “worst case” analysis, when accurate data were unavailable about the likely array of possible
outcomes of a proposed action).
152. See letter from Charles R. Gellner, Senior Specialist, Congr. Rsch. Serv., quoted in letter from
Sens. Sparkman & Case, supra note 16 (explaining that “[a]nalysis implies an examination of such matters
as causes, effects, purposes, accompanying circumstances, alternatives, reasons in favor or against, costs
versus benefits, and historical evolution. To put it in other ways, an analysis of impact might explore
historical, political, economic and military factors, or it might be concerned with long-range, or medium
and short-term elements.”).
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up the most controversial points for consideration within national and international
political venues.153

D. Who Should Participate in the Drafting and Development of an ACIS?
Again, the most squarely applicable precedents press in opposite directions
on the question of which federal agencies should routinely participate in the
articulation of a new ACIS. Under NEPA, the initiative ordinarily falls to the one
agency that is the lead proponent of the anticipated action. Occasionally, other
agencies may also participate as their interests are implicated.154 The original ACIS
process, on the other hand, was always a fully interagency affair. Sometimes the
sponsor of the weapon program (the Department of Defense or the Department of
Energy) undertook the initial drafting; sometimes ACDA took the lead. In either
event, the evolving ACIS was discussed and edited collectively by the national
security agencies (including the White House). The result, critics complained, was
too often a “least common denominator” document that reflected the executive
branch’s collective “party line,” rather than preserve contrasting and dissenting
views.155
The 1999 abolition of ACDA156 – and the seeming improbability of its
revival today157 – alters the bureaucratic landscape that would accommodate a new
ACIS process. There is no permanent institutional “skeptic” to challenge the views
of the “hard line” departments that would usually be the principal sources of
153. 1979 Hearings, supra note 7, at 68 (comments of Paul Walker, suggesting that ACIS do not
need to include a bottom-line conclusion); CRS 1979 Analysis, supra note 7, at 10 (questioning what type
of presentation of conflicting opinions and data would be most useful in an ACIS). For comparison, see
UNCLOS, supra note 108, includes both a “procedural” requirement for environmental impact analysis,
arts. 204-06, and a “substantive” obligation to prevent, reduce, and control various sources of pollution,
arts. 207-12.
154. Mandelker, supra note 49, § 2:18 (noting that each federal agency adopts its own rules for
implementing NEPA, including regulations proposed by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency on Oct. 21, 1980, to implement its own NEPA obligations, 45 Fed. Reg. 69510 (1980)).
155. For comparison, the process for evaluating the legality of a new weapon has traditionally been
solely the responsibility of the Department of Defense, without regular interagency input. See, for
example, DEP’T OF THE ARMY, Legal Review of Weapons and Weapon Systems, AR §§ 27-53 (Oct. 23, 2019).
156. See The ACDA-USCI Merger into State — The End of an Era, ASS’N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. AND
TRAINING (Mar. 18, 2022), https://adst.org/2016/10/acda-usia-merger-into-state-end-of-an-era/.
157. See, e.g., James E. Goodby & David A. Koplow, An Ambitious Arms Control Agenda Requires a
New Organization Equal to the Task, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Jan. 26, 2021),
https://thebulletin.org/premium/2021-01/an-ambitious-arms-control-agenda-requires-a-neworganization-equal-to-the-task/; Rebecca Davis Gibbons, Bring Back the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, BELFER CTR. (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/bring-back-arms-controland-disarmament-agency; Leon Ratz, Organizing for Arms Control: The National Security Implications of the
Loss
of
an
Independent
Arms
Control
Agency,
BELFER
CTR.
(Sept.
2013),
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Organizing%20for%20Arms%20Control%20%20Web%203.pdf.
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information about new weapon programs. On the other hand, some of the traditional
tensions inside the executive branch and with the Congress regarding the original
ACIS routine stemmed from the fact that it was ACDA, the persistent institutional
gadfly, that was the central node for the project. And sometimes, ACDA may have
soft-peddled some of its instinctive vigor in the ACIS process, due to a desire to
retain good working relationships with the other bureaucratic entities.158
In a revised ACIS process, several different agencies might be called upon
to initiate the review for different types of programs and activities. As before, the
Department of Defense and the Department of Energy would be expected to lead
the drafting enterprise regarding most new weapons, including decisions to conduct
research, testing, production, and deployment. Components of the Intelligence
Community might likewise initiate some new ACIS, and comment on others. The
Department of State would be expected to lead the preparation of documents about
proposals to undertake or resist negotiation of new arms control treaties, and to
contribute most authoritatively about the likely foreign responses to new U.S.
weapon programs that were the subject of an ACIS drafted by other agencies. Acting
in its coordinating role, the National Security Council staff could also contribute its
perspectives to the documents and would be responsible for ensuring that the whole
federal national security community participated fully and in a timely manner.
The new ACIS should be conceptualized as a responsibility on the entire
executive branch, to ensure the collection of expertise from all the affected
stakeholders.159 Of course, there is always a danger that an enforced groupthink will
inhibit creativity and suppress outlying views. Yet, there are also plenty of examples
of robust, sustained interagency differences of opinion.160
It might be theoretically possible to create an outside (or semi-outside)
independent review body to adjudicate agencies’ competing positions regarding a
draft ACIS, and to ensure that the interagency process was honestly collecting and
evaluating all the diverse considerations and perspectives. But that is not the
proposal here.161 ACDA was not truly that sort of ombudsperson for the original
158. Just as the EPA has many duties beyond the EIS process, the original ACIS process was a
relatively small part of ACDA’s statutory responsibilities. The maintenance of functional interagency
relationships therefore had to be a priority.
159. Like NEPA, the ACIS requirement would not apply to the President, the Congress, or federal
courts. 40 C.F.R. 1508.12 (2022).
160. See Eric Rosenbach & Aki J. Peritz, National Intelligence Estimates, BELFER CTR. 37 (July
2009),https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/IC-book-finalasof12JUNE.pdf
(noting that the process of securing interagency agreement on a national intelligence estimate can
encounter problems of gridlock, compromise to a “lowest common denominator,” and groupthink).
161. As noted above, the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Research Service both
undertook thorough evaluations of the early ACIS submissions, assisting the Congress in reviewing the
executive branch filings, and the Congressional Research Service drafted “model” evaluations. Supra note
19. Agency inspector generals also perform an independent watchdog function. See COUNCIL OF THE
INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, https://www.ignet.gov/ (last visited April 1, 2022).
Another model is provided by the U.S. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, an independent
agency within the executive branch established to “ensure that the federal government’s efforts to prevent
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ACIS; the agency was fully part of the executive branch, and the Director served at
the pleasure of the president. For comparison, the Council on Environmental
Quality has some leadership responsibility to sit on top of the EIS process – it can
issue binding regulations interpreting and applying the underlying statute in a way
that ACDA never could. But CEQ does not have the authority to insist that an
environmental assessment process be initiated or to reject or amend a draft EIS.

E. What Role Should Outsiders Play in Commenting on a Draft ACIS?
In the NEPA process, a draft EIS is ordinarily released for public notice
and comment, and the proponent is required to consider and respond to that input
before the document is finalized and the decision can be made to proceed with the
proposal. In the original ACIS process, there was no minuet of that sort. The
executive branch delivered all the statements in a single batch to Congress, and that
was the end of the process until the next year’s cycle.162
This Article tilts toward the NEPA mechanism here, for three related
reasons. First, there is the general value of transparency and accountability, in
displaying the government’s procedures and rationales for all to see. This helps to
ensure against an adverse “capture” of the process by interested insiders. Second, is
the virtue of public participation, allowing the full-throated democratic process to
assert itself before an irrevocable decision is cast on such monumental issues. Third,
the wisdom of the crowd may contribute facts or rebuttal ideas that the executive
branch has not yet fully considered. The process of social engagement can lead to
better decisions.
In a democracy, multiple voices should have a meaningful opportunity to
second-guess the agency that initially sponsors a major arms control-related program,
and all three branches of government can play their roles. Inside the executive
branch, divergent agency perspectives can be marshalled. Congress should review
the new ACIS documents when it legislates or provides advice and consent to
treaties. As discussed below, judicial review can play an indispensable role, too. One
important institutional reform for the legislative branch would be simply to pay more
attention to the ACIS documents. If Congress were to take its unique role in the
ACIS process more seriously by studying and discussing the submissions, citing them
in hearings and in floor debates, and generally holding the executive’s feet to the fire,

terrorism are balanced with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties.” History and Mission, U.S. PRIV.
https://www.pclob.gov/About/HistoryMission (last visited April
1, 2022). None of these institutions seems appropriate for the mission of reconciling competing
interagency perspectives about the arms control impacts of controversial programs.
AND CIV. LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD.,

162. For comparison, under UNCLOS, supra note 108, art. 205, a party is required to publish the
results of its environmental investigations or to provide reports to other states at appropriate intervals.
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that degree of oversight would also prompt better performance by any
administration.163

F. Should There Be Judicial Review of a New ACIS?
In some ways, the topic of judicial review poses the most difficult question
for the proposal – whether to promote opportunities for a new wave of protracted
litigation and the concomitant delays and costs. There are important competing
considerations on both sides.
On the one hand, ACIS litigation would surely threaten to slow the alreadycumbersome process of government decision-making in the national security space.
Sometimes, it does not matter so much what a decision is – it just matters that there
be a decision; the familiar military epigram holds that a “good” solution today is
better than a “perfect” solution tomorrow. In addition, for many of the programs
addressed here, there is not a genuinely “perfect” answer. These programs are the
fodder for persistent, indeterminate political wrangling among domestic and
international contestants, which is not so suitable for cool courtroom evaluation.
Likewise, there are often significant financial penalties in delay – if procurements are
interrupted or modified, then the costs inevitably rise.
Relatedly, a long line of canonical judicial opinions acknowledges the
importance of allowing the United States to “speak with one voice” when confronting
foreign sovereigns. There can be great value in maximizing the opportunity for the
executive branch to construct a policy that is consistent and unequivocal, especially
where primordial issues of national security are implicated.164 Any procedure that
delayed or befuddled the President’s ability to achieve closure on a decision would
disserve the goals of cohesiveness and responsiveness, which can be critical.
On the other hand, one clear lesson from juxtaposing the EIS and ACIS
experiences is that only the availability of judicial review puts real teeth into the
assessment process.165 Despite the facially mandatory obligation for robust, reflective
pre-decisional evaluation, the U.S. government will not approach the task with full
seriousness if left wholly to its own devices. Only the prospect of having an
independent branch looking over its shoulder drives the process forward. Therefore,
this Article recommends a statutory provision explicitly applying NEPA-like
provisions for judicial review to enforce a new ACIS structure. Similar to NEPA,
there should be no provision for the award of monetary damages in ACIS litigation.
163. See Clarke, supra note 3, at 201-03 (discussing rare instances of Congress using information
from an ACIS during legislative debates or citing failure to complete an ACIS on a particular program as
a reason to withhold its funding).
164. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby
and the One-Voice Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 975 (2001).
165. Mandelker, supra note 49, § 3:1 (concluding that “judicial review is the principal means
through which NEPA is enforced”).
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The relief would ordinarily be injunctive, ordering the lead agency to undertake a
more thorough ACIS analytic and drafting process.166
The time lag for accommodating judicial review of a new ACIS should be
modest – the court is not second-guessing the substantive correctness of the
government’s decision to procure a new weapon or to initiate a new treaty. Instead,
the scope of review focuses precisely on the mechanical completeness of the
government’s decision-making process. Did the affected agencies seriously study the
program’s likely impact on the entire array of national security values at stake? Did
they consider full range of long- and short-term arms control consequences? Did they
genuinely give the requisite hard look to all the available alternatives and opposing
views?167
Moreover, it is not as if the existing U.S. governmental process for making
all these critical national security choices is currently such a paragon of smooth,
timely, consistent operations, which would be suddenly upset by the introduction of
this one-and-only exogenous influence. There are already so many imponderables at
play and so many disruptive influences that impede and clog the bureaucratic process.
A new ACIS might appropriately be regarded as simply a de minimis accretion.
Finally, it should be noted that these same types of objections were made, and
continue to be made, about the launch of the EIS process. Yet the past fifty years’
experience demonstrates how the governmental system can continue to grind
forward, even while grudgingly acknowledging the additional requirements.
A final important aspect of this puzzle will generally remain beyond the
scope of this Article: Who should have the requisite standing to sue, to vindicate the
commitments of a new ACIS process? There are several parties such as arms control
NGOs that could possibly vindicate an interest in arms control, occupying a similar
role as environmental NGOs, but there would be unique obstacles where the NEPA
example would not be informative. Some of the early NEPA litigation turned on
questions of standing: suits initiated by economic rivals or by members of Congress
generally fared poorly, while citizen groups and public interest organizations (as well
as states and tribal authorities) who have actually used the natural resources
threatened by a proposed governmental action have often had more success at
satisfying the necessary “injury in fact” and other statutory and constitutional tests.168
However, it would be much harder for an arms control plaintiff to demonstrate that
type of specific, personal engagement in a way that would be distinguishable from

166. See Pye v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 513 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. 45,149.58 Acres
of Land, 455 F. Supp. 192 (E.D.N.C. 1978); Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 4:8, 4:77.
167. See Mandelker, supra note 49, § 10:62 (discussing courts’ general deference to an agency’s
decision about the methodology to use in an EIS).
168. Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 4:9 (observing that “Standing to sue under NEPA has not usually
been troublesome,” but noting zigzags in Supreme Court attitudes), 4:15; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972) (allowing standing for users of a national park, but not for the general public or for
environmental organizations); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (discussing “injury in
fact”).
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the community as a whole. This puzzle will require additional creative thought for
a new ACIS process so that the courtroom doors will open up just wide enough.169

G. What Flexibility Should Be Built into the ACIS Process?
Like NEPA, a new ACIS mechanism should admit a range of variations
and escape hatches. For example, there could be a routine for expedited review of a
proposed decision that seems superficially to fall within the scope of the ACIS
requirement but does not truly present important issues. If that preliminary
investigation concluded that the program would carry only minor, remote, or
speculative effects on arms control and related values, then a public “Finding of No
Significant Impact” could issue and the process would end.170
Likewise, it should be possible to cluster together a number of similar or
related programs that would carry congruent impacts and evaluate them in a single
integrated instrument.171 There could also be tiers of review in appropriate
circumstances, such as allowing a high-level “programmatic” ACIS, to be
supplemented by one or more small-scale ACIS documents to scrutinize local or
specific aspects. The equivalent of an Environmental Assessment, disposing of an
inquiry relatively quickly, could also be a useful device in a new ACIS process. All
of these instruments could be subject to subsequent re-analysis if important features
or contexts change.
Of special importance in the national security realm, an ACIS could be
prepared in both classified and unclassified form, as the original ACIS submissions
were.172 The classified version (or a detachable classified annex) could include
169. Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 4:24 (discussing the requirement that standing requires a
plaintiff to show that he or she is within the “zone of interest” sought to be protected by the statutory
scheme allegedly violated), 4:28 (discussing standing for interest-group organizations), 4:30 (discussing
proposals for citizens’ suits), 12.8 (discussing standing under several states’ versions of NEPA legislation).
It might also be possible to streamline future ACIS litigation by establishing procedures to
concentrate the caseload in a single specialty court, with expert judges and an expedited timetable, but
that concept lies outside the scope of this Article. See Dycus, Secrets, supra note 93, at 310.
170. See Mandelker supra, text accompanying note 59 (regarding a “finding of no significant impact”
in environmental practice); 1979 Hearings, supra note 7, at 85 (additional responses from Barry Blechman,
suggesting that ACIS should focus on major systems, rather than trying to evaluate each program
annually).
171. Mandelker, supra note 49, § 10:58 (discussing treatment of connected, cumulative, and similar
programs and effects in an EIS); Hart & Tsang, supra note 74 (noting that revised CEQ regulations in
2020 narrowed the definition of “effects” that must be addressed in an EIS). See also supra note 7
(discussing procedures for combining aggregates of programs in the original ACIS mechanism); CRS 1979
Analysis, supra note 7, at 19 (considering four options for addressing a military program in an ACIS:
prepare an individual statement about it, include the program in an aggregate ACIS, place the program
on an exclusion list, and do nothing).
172. Other comparable documents regarding national security policy are routinely prepared in both
classified and unclassified versions. See, e.g., DEP’T OF STATE, ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH
ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS 1
(2021), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/2021-Adherence-to-and-Compliance-With-
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protected information, such as relevant details about a new weapon’s performance
parameters or intelligence about how a particular foreign state would likely react to
a proposed new treaty. The classified version would be submitted to Congress and
would not be subject to public or judicial review.173
In addition, if a particular vital national security program truly were on such
a “fast track” that elaboration of the ordinary full-scale ACIS algorithm would be
improvident, a shortcut should be available. Again, the EIS process points the way:
in an emergency, where immediate federal action is imperative, an agency can
undertake the necessary prompt steps, and then develop an alternative mechanism
for satisfying NEPA after the fact. Use of this escape hatch would have to be
unusual; the exception should not swallow the rule. Most of the weapons and other
programs of greatest interest in this context are multi-year undertakings. While their
proponents routinely claim that only a “short fuse” is applicable for their
consideration, that is rarely the case.174
Finally, Congress could legislatively exempt a particular decision, or a
category of decisions, from the ACIS process. This is a step that has been frequently
advocated, but rarely invoked, for NEPA. Decisions to deploy military forces into
combat or for immediate deterrence operations should be subject to those waivers.175

V. ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATIONS
It would surely be premature to proffer here an illustrative draft of a sample
future ACIS, since any such document would be lengthy, time-sensitive, and based
on close collaboration with multiple stakeholders. But in order to demonstrate more
vividly the parameters of the proposal, and to suggest how it might add value to the
existing governmental processes, this section sketches rough portraits of what might
be elaborated in the future as applied to particular weapons and diplomatic initiatives
of great current import.

Arms-Control-Nonproliferation-and-Disarmament-Agreements-and-Commitments.pdf; OFF. OF THE
SEC’Y OF DEF., MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA,2020ANNUALREPORTTOCONGRESS1(2020),https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/20024
88689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF.
173. Alternatively, judicial review of a classified ACIS could be permitted in camera, as occurs in
some other national security contexts. The court would not be authorized to second-guess any intelligence
reports or to decide whether a particular threat was overstated, but simply to assess whether the executive
branch had faithfully attended to all the relevant ACIS considerations, alternatives, and possibilities for
mitigation of adverse effects.
174. In an emergency, where immediate federal action is necessary to safeguard life, property, or
resources, so the ordinary environmental assessment process would be impractical, an agency may initiate
prompt action and then work with CEQ for alternative mechanisms to satisfy NEPA. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.12
(2022); Mandelker, supra note 49, § 5:17.
175. Mandelker, supra note 49, §§ 5:13 (discussing situations in which an agency’s statutory
obligation to complete a particular action within a specified, short timeframe may preclude preparation of
an EIS), 7:17 (discussing use, abuse, and proposals to reform NEPA categorical exclusions).
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A. Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems
One of the most contentious current national security debates swirls around
the prospect of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS – also known by their
opponents as “killer robots”). These are devices in which the weapon itself decides
(in various ways) where to travel, how to select appropriate targets, and whether to
unleash deadly force. Crucially, this is all done without the control, input, or
knowledge of any human being “in the loop.” There are no true fully autonomous
anti-personnel weapons in operation today, but there are already instances that come
close, such as quite autonomous weapons deployed for anti-missile ship-defense
functions. Perhaps more importantly, the clear trend of the research and
development is pressing vigorously in this direction.176 International diplomacy, as
usual, lags behind the entrepreneurial researchers, and the United States has played
a mixed role – partially piloting the development of the artificial intelligence
weaponry, partially engaging in expert-level international deliberations, and partially
resisting the convocation of full-fledged negotiations on a treaty that would somehow
restrict LAWS.177
In this situation (or, in truth, some years before the LAWS programs had
advanced to their current status), an ACIS process would be valuable. There are
multiple divergent factors to consider here: in an appropriate combat situation,
LAWS could provide an important military capacity, operating faster than humans
could, incorporating multiple sensory inputs, and being free from the distractions of
human emotions and bodily functions.178 Still, no one can be confident that robots
176. DANIEL S. HOADLEY & KELLEY M. SAYLER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45178, ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 15-16 (2020), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R45178.pdf;
Arthur Holland Michel, Known Unknowns: Data Issues and Military Autonomous Systems, UN INST. FOR
DISARMAMENT RSCH (2021), https://unidir.org/known-unknowns; ALEXANDRE DE GUSMÃO FOUND.,
RioSeminaronAutonomousWeaponsSystems(2020),http://funag.gov.br/biblioteca/download/laws_digital.
pdf; Vincent Boulanin et. al., Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, STOCKHOLM INT’L
PEACE RSCH. INST. 23-30 (2020), https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/other-publications/artificialintelligence-strategic-stability-and-nuclear-risk.
177. KELLEY M. SAYLER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11150, DEFENSE PRIMER: U.S. POLICY ON
LETHALAUTONOMOUSWEAPONSYSTEMS(2021),https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF1
1150#:~:text=Lethal%20autonomous%20weapon%20systems%20(LAWS,human%20control%20of%20the
%20system; KELLEY M. SAYLER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11294, INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSIONS
CONCERNINGLETHALAUTONOMOUSWEAPONSYSTEMS(2021),https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/IF1
1294.pdf.
178. Jessica Cox & Heather Williams, The Unavoidable Technology: How Artificial Intelligence Can
Strengthen Nuclear Stability, WASH. Q. (Spring 2021); NAT’L SEC. COMM’N ON A.I.: FINAL REP. (2021),
https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf; DEF. INNOVATION BD.,
AI PRINCIPLES: RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ETHICAL USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE BY THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEFENSE
(2019),
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/2002204458/1/1/0/dib_ai_principles_primary_document.pdf; ROBERT O. WORK, PRINCIPLES FOR THE COMBAT
EMPLOYMENT OF WEAPON SYSTEMS WITH AUTONOMOUS FUNCTIONALITIES, CTR. FOR A NEW AM.
SEC.
(2021),
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/proposed-dod-principles-for-the-combatemployment-of-weapon-systems-with-autonomous-functionalities.
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would perform flawlessly in making the excruciating life-or-death choices on the
battlefield, and there are profound moral implications in turning over to a computer
the ability to take human lives. Who would be responsible, both legally and ethically,
when something goes wrong in the execution? Additionally, the United States is
hardly the only country interested in exploring and developing LAWS. It seems
apparent that unilateral self-restraint will not dissuade others from pursuing the
opportunities. But the reverse proposition seems equally valid, because if the United
States barrels headlong into the LAWS business, others would surely follow. The
ensuing race would propel the world farther and faster in a direction that we all might
eventually regret.179 At this point, the proto-diplomatic enterprise is somewhat
stuck; countries are far apart in their perspectives about autonomy, while the bigger
picture multinational pursuit of artificial intelligence, enhanced sensors, and robotics
threatens to destabilize current thinking.
Even a rigorous ACIS would not provide an ultimate one-size-fits-all
solution to this problem. However, it would provide a vehicle for assembling the
government’s best thinking, testing it against skeptical counterarguments, combining
into one document the swirl of military, diplomatic, technical, moral, and other
considerations, and exposing all that to the glare of public notice and comment.

B. Anti-satellite Capabilities
Equally futuristic – and equally poised for perhaps irrevocable decisions
right now – is a cluster of programs aimed at asserting greater military control over
outer space. The United States, Russia, China, and others are experimenting with a
wide array of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and associated new tactics, techniques,
and procedures to threaten each other’s spacecraft and the vital services they provide
to the global economy.180 The dangers of offensive space control weapons are
179. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & INT’L HUM. RIGHTS CLINIC, Areas of Alignment: Common Visions
for a Killer Robots Treaty, (July 2021), https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/08/02/areas-alignment; ICRC
Position on Autonomous Weapon Systems, Background Paper, May 12, 2021; Paul Scharre, Debunking the
AI Arms Race Theory, 4 TEX. NAT’L SEC. REV. 3 (Jun. 28, 2021), https://tnsr.org/2021/06/debunking-theai-arms-race-theory/; Zachary Fryer-Biggs, Can Computer Algorithms Learn to Fight Wars Ethically? WASH.
POST (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/magazine/2021/02/17/pentagon-funds-killerrobots-but-ethics-are-under-debate/; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Crunch Time on Killer Robots: Why New
Law
Is
Needed
and
How
It
Can
Be
Achieved
(December
2021),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/11/Crunch%20Time%20on%20Killer%20Robots_fin
al.pdf.
180. BRIAN WEEDEN & VICTORIA SAMSON, GLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES: AN OPEN
SOURCEASSESSMENT(2022),https://swfound.org/media/207344/swf_global_counterspace_capabilities
_2022.pdf; Kaitlyn Johnson et al., CSIS AEROSPACE SEC. PROJECT, SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT
(2022); Elbridge Colby, From Sanctuary to Battlefield: A Framework for a U.S. Defense and Deterrence Strategy
for Space, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC. (Jan. 2016), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/fromsanctuary-to-battlefield-a-framework-for-a-us-defense-and-deterrence-strategy-for-space;DEF.
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
CHALLENGES
TO
SECURITY
IN
SPACE
(2022),
https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/Challenges_Security_
Space_2022.pdf
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profound, but it is not too late to take effective arms control measures. Testing is
being undertaken currently, but there is not widespread deployment yet, and there
have been no uses in combat.
Again, the current situation defies easy solutions. Satellites have become
so important to modern militaries that in a future conflict, they could well become
priority targets.181 At the same time, physical destruction of satellites would pollute
the orbital regime with immense quantities of long-lasting, fast-flying debris that
could jeopardize all space operations for decades to come.182 From the diplomatic
perspective, the world has long been politically stymied in efforts even to begin the
articulation of an effective arms control regime in space, and a future agreement
restricting ASATs would immediately face challenges from ineffable problems with
verification of compliance.183 Many space assets are dual-use, being capable of
adaptation for either peaceful or warlike functions, so the traditional principles of the
law of armed conflict are threatened in new ways.184 A technology that enables
delicate functions like “rendezvous and proximity operations” (enabling a spacecraft
to closely approach and dock with another satellite) can be used for on-orbit servicing

181. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEFENSE SPACE STRATEGY SUMMARY 3 (2020); U.S. SPACE
FORCE, SPACEPOWER: DOCTRINE FOR SPACE FORCES, SPACE CAPSTONE PUBLICATION 28–44 (2020),
https://www.spaceforce.mil/Portals/1/Space%20Capstone%20Publication_10%20Aug%202020.pdf; U.S.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Joint Publication 3-14, SPACE OPERATIONS II-1 to II-8 (2018); Robert S.
Wilson et al., The Value of Space, AEROSPACE CORP. 1–12 (2020); Ricky J. Lee & Sarah L. Steele, Military
Use of Satellite Communications, Remote Sensing, and Global Positioning Systems in the War on Terror, 79 J. AIR
LAW & COM. 69 (2014).
182. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL ORBITAL DEBRIS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN (Jan.
2021), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/National-Orbital-Debris-RDPlan-2021.pdf; Raffi Khatchadourien, The Elusive Peril of Space Junk, NEW YORKER (Sept. 21, 2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/09/28/the-elusive-peril-of-space-junk; Allen Kim, NASA
Admin Warns ISS Space Junk Problem Is Getting Worse After 3 Near Collisions, CNN (Sept. 23, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/23/us/nasa-iss-space-debris-scn-trnd/index.html.
183. Brian Weeden & Victoria Samson, Enhancing Space Security: Time for Legally Binding
Measures, ARMS CONTROL TODAY 6 (Dec. 2020), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/202012/features/enhancing-space-security-time-legally-binding-measures; Christopher A. Ford, Arms Control
in Outer Space: History and Prospects, 1 DEP’T OF STATE ARMS CONTROL & INT’L SEC. PAPERS no.
12 (July 24, 2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/T-Paper-Series-Space-NormsFormatted-T-w-Raymond-quote-2543.pdf; Theresa Hitchens, In a First, Sec Def Pledges DoD to Space
Norms, BREAKING DEF. (July 19, 2021), https://breakingdefense.com/2021/07/exclusive-in-a-first-secdefpledges-dod-to-space-norms/.
184. Vasha Agrawal & Anil Maini, Satellite Technology: Principles and Applications, O’REILLY,
https://www.oreilly.com/library/view/satellite-technology-principles/9781118636374/c06.xhtml
(last
visited Feb. 25, 2021); Chris Woodford, Satellites, EXPLAINTHATSTUFF! (Dec. 16, 2020),
https://www.explainthatstuff.com/satellites.html; G. Ryan Faith, The Future of Space: Trouble on the Final
Frontier, 175 WORLD AFFS. 82, 84 (Sept./Oct. 2012); Kestutis Paulauskas, Space: NATO’s Latest Frontier,
NATO REV. (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/03/13/space-natos-latestfrontier/index.html; Michael N. Schmitt, International Law and Military Operations in Space, 10 MAX
PLANCK YEARBOOK OF U.N.L. 89, 117 (2006).
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(to repair or refuel a limping object) or to inspect or attack it.185 In addition, many
ASAT technologies are quite similar to anti-missile technologies, so any effort to deal
effectively with either category would inevitably also implicate the interests of the
other, too.186
In this environment, an ACIS (or a group of ACIS documents) would face
a daunting task in seeking to define the problem, to parse its various components,
and to generate a consensus analysis. But that sheer difficulty also illustrates the
value of the undertaking, because it would present a rare opportunity to think
critically about a tremendously important emerging weapons technology before the
horse runs irretrievably out of the barn. Multiple types of expertise would have to
be marshaled in order to write rigorously about the opportunities, dangers, and
alternatives – drawing upon space technology, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy,
and private space sector interests.

C. The Treaty on Land Mines
Third, consider a somewhat different type of potential ACIS venue,
regarding diplomatic action rather than weapon developments. Anti-personnel land
mines (APL) have been the subject of two treaties, only one of which the United
States has joined. The more ambitious instrument, the Ottawa Convention,
completely prohibits any use of these devices, and has been accepted by almost all of
the United States’ closest allies.187 The other document, known as Amended Protocol
II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, limits but does not totally
bar, APL use. It has attracted the participation of the United States and the other
countries that have been major users and stockpilers of the devices.188 The United

185. Rebecca Reesman & Andrew Rogers, Getting in Your Space: Learning from Past Rendezvous and
Proximity Operations, AEROSPACE CORP. (May 2018); Anuradha Damale, Rendezvous Proximity Operations:
Not Operating in Isolation, EUR. LEADERSHIP NETWORK (Aug. 12, 2020); NASA, Rendezvous, Proximity,
andDocking(2011),https://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/pdf/639730main_Proximity_Rendezvous_Do
cking_FTI.pdf.
186. Ashton B. Carter, The Relationship of ASAT and BMD Systems, 114 DAEDALUS 2 (1985); Joan
Johnson-Freese, The Viability of U.S. Antisatellite (ASAT) Policy: Moving Toward Space Control, INST. FOR
NAT’L SEC. STUD. (Jan. 2000), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA435085.pdf; Arms Control in Space,
ASAT,BMD,andthe1972ABMTreaty(1984),https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk3/1984/8404/840409
.PDF (last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
187. Ottawa Mines Convention, supra note 150; see INT’L CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES,
Landmine Monitor 2020 (Nov. 12, 2020), http://the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2020/landmine-monitor2020.aspx (listing 164 parties to the treaty).
188. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To
Have Indiscriminate Effects), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Dec. 2, 1983; entered
into force for the United States Sept. 24, 1995); U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFFS., CCW Amended
Protocol II, https://www.un.org/disarmament/ccw-amended-protocol-ii/ (amended in 1996).
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States has repeatedly contemplated joining the Ottawa Convention but has always
backed away.189
A new ACIS could contribute to this prolonged, multi-faceted debate,
bringing together the diverse constituencies that have expressed competing interests.
First, some experts believe that APL offer unique military advantages by providing
protection against infiltration along an exposed flank or a porous national border.
Others dispute that judgment, asserting that the mine barrier could be swiftly
breached or circumvented.190 Some experts emphasize how the U.S. posture has
separated it from NATO allies, because the treaty blocks close collaboration between
mine-using and mine-opposing states. Others emphasize how the national defense
of South Korea, another close, longstanding ally, depends on extravagant use of APL
throughout the demilitarized zone.191 Some participants in the debate are motivated
by humanitarian considerations, stressing that APL tend to detonate most often
against civilians, especially children, who do not understand the long-term danger
that these small, concealed implements carry. Others assert that the most modern
types of APL, preferred by the United States, carry timed self-neutralization features
that render them safe and eliminate the prolonged danger to civilians.192 Some

189. Mary Wareham, US Should Think Again About Reversing Landmine Policy, JUST SEC. (Feb. 4,
2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/68474/us-should-think-again-about-reversing-landmine-policy/; Jeff
Abramson, U.S. to Revise Landmine Policy, ARMS CONTROL TODAY (May 2021),
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-05/news-briefs/us-revise-landmine-policy;
Ellen
Mitchell,
Bipartisan Group of 21 Lawmakers Push Biden to Ban Most Landmines, THE HILL (June 23, 2021),
https://thehill.com/policy/defense/559832-bipartisan-group-of-21-lawmakers-push-biden-to-ban-mostlandmines.
190. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Landmine Policy (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2071692/landmine-policy/ (stating that
“Landmines, including APL, remain a vital tool in conventional warfare that the United States military
cannot responsibly forgo.”); Stephen D. Biddle, Julia L. Klare, & Jaeson Rosenfeld, The Military Utility of
Landmines: Implications for Arms Control, INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSES (June 1, 1994); Nick Adde, U.S.
Reintroduction
of
Landmines
Sparks
Controversy,
NAT’L DEF.
(Mar.
26,
2020),
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/3/26/us-reintroduction-of-landmines-sparkscontroversy; John F. Troxell, Landmines: Why the Korea Exception Should Be the Rule, 30 PARAMETERS 82
(2000); Kristian Berg Harpviken & Mona Fixdal, Anti-Personnel Landmines: A Just Means of War? 28 SEC.
DIALOGUE 271, 280 (Sept. 1997).
191. See Ottawa Convention, supra note 150, art. 1.1(c) (obligating treaty parties not to “assist,
encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this
Convention”); South Korea, LANDMINE & CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR (Oct. 19, 2020),
http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2020/korea,-republic-of/mine-ban-policy.aspx; U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, U.S. Landmine Policy, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c11735.htm (last visited Apr. 10,
2022) (archived material).
192. See HUM. RIGHTS WATCH, Questions and Answers on the New US Landmine Policy ¶ 4 (Feb.
27, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/27/questions-and-answers-new-us-landmine-policy#
[hereinafter HRW Q&A]; Friends Committee on National LegisLATION, Issue Brief: U.S. Policy on
Landmines, April 1, 2021; ICBL, Arguments for the Ban, http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/problem/argumentsfor-the-ban.aspx; John Ismay, The U.S. Army Is Trying to Develop New Land Mines – Ones That Don’t
Harm Civilians, New York Times Magazine, November 13, 2018.
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believe that technological alternatives to land mines could be developed, but
persistent U.S. research has not yet identified a truly suitable fallback capacity.193
This is not an issue about imminent U.S. production and deployment of
the weapons in question – the United States has not manufactured new APL since
1997 and has no plans to resume construction.194 Moreover, the United States has
not used APL in any of the widely-varied military engagements it has fought for the
past thirty years. But some contend that this past practice does not guaranty that
APL will never be needed in the future.195
So, once again, there is much that an ACIS could address by applying
military, diplomatic, technological, humanitarian, and other expertise. It would
surely not impose an undue time delay to commit to an all-azimuth review, as the
rival treaties have been available for many years. The public could contribute to, and
learn from, the ACIS process here, even if some of the most intricate military details
and the nuances of alliance relationships might remain classified. Notably, the U.S.
government’s decision to date not to join the Ottawa Convention could be construed
as a major federal action, prompting an ACIS (as comparable inaction has been
construed under NEPA).196

D. Other Imminent Choices
Finally, there are numerous other types of arms control-related decisions
that could be profitably scrutinized through a new ACIS process. Several of these
are newly emerging dangers and opportunities; they are “hot button” issues for some
constituencies, but they have not received the type of all-source, authoritative, indepth critical analysis in a public government evaluation that an ACIS could provide.
None of these is, strictly speaking, a decision about U.S. funding for the production
or deployment of a new weapon. Therefore, it is not clear whether the original
concept of an ACIS would apply to any of them, but this Article’s vision of a new
ACIS system could attach to all.
193. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, Medicine, Alternative Technologies to Replace
Antipersonnel Landmines 35 (2001), https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/10071/alternativetechnologies-to-replace-antipersonnel-landmines; HRW Q&A, supra note 192, at 8.
194. LANDMINE & CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, United States Mine Ban Policy (Mar. 19, 2020),
http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2019/united-states/mine-ban-policy.aspx; HRW Q&A, supra
note 192, ¶ 6.
195. LANDMINE & CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, supra note 194; see also HRW Q&A, supra
note 192, ¶ 14 (noting that with a single exception in 2002, U.S. forces have not used antipersonnel mines
in combat since 1991).
196. In the same way, an ACIS could also suitably analyze U.S. decisions not to join other
noteworthy multilateral arms control treaties, such as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,
supra note 150, or the ATT, supra note 112. The treatment of “inaction” has been controversial under
NEPA, and the Trump Administration deleted the general regulatory requirement to evaluate an agency’s
decision not to act on a matter that could have environmental impact. See COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY,
Redline Markup of 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (July 16, 2020), https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/laws-regulations/ceq-finalrule-redline-changes-2020-07-16.pdf.
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--The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the nuclear deal with Iran)
carries profound consequences for the Middle East and for nuclear proliferation more
broadly. It has been the subject of intense political controversy in the United States
and elsewhere, regarding its creation, the subsequent U.S. withdrawal from it, and
its possible revival. But since it is a non-legally binding instrument, the JCPOA was
never presented for the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.197
--In recent years, the U.S. government has raised, and to some extent
adopted, a tactic of “defend forward” in the cyber realm. This proactive posture
involves a more assertive approach of electronically pursuing malicious cyber actors
outside the United States, including the possibility of “hacking back,” to deny an
adversary the benefits of a hostile network operation and to disrupt future plans.
Any such effort could be quite consequential in the long term, altering global norms
about appropriate and acceptable extraterritorial cyber behaviors. To date, heavy
classification and the highly technical nature of the operation have obscured full
public commentary about it, and there has been no public agnostic presentation about
it similar to what an ACIS could provide.198
--The United States has recently withdrawn from a number of important
multilateral arms control treaties, including the 1992 Open Skies Treaty199 and the

197. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, https://20092017.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/index.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2022); ARMS CONTROL ASSOC.,
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance Fact Sheet (July 2021),
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance; David S. Jonas, Joe Biden Should Renegotiate
Iran
Nuclear
Deal
as
a
Treaty,
WASH.
TIMES
(Dec.
29,
2020),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/dec/29/david-s-jonas-joe-biden-should-treat-iran-nuclear/; see Robert Einhorn, Debating the Iran Nuclear Deal: A Former American Negotiator Outlines the Battleground
Issues, BROOKINGS (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/research/debating-the-iran-nuclear-deala-former-american-negotiator-outlines-the-battleground-issues/.
198. Eric Talbot Jensen & Sean Watts, Due Diligence and the U.S. Defend Forward Cyber Strategy,
LAWFARE (Oct. 20, 2020, 11:06 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/due-diligence-and-us-defendforward-cyber-strategy; Erica D. Lonergan, Operationalizing Defend Forward: How the Concept Works to
Change
Adversary
Behavior,
LAWFARE
(Mar.
12,
2020,
3:28
PM)
https://www.lawfareblog.com/operationalizing-defend-forward-how-concept-works-change-adversarybehavior; Nina Kollars & Jacquelyn Schneider, Defending Forward: The 2018 Cyber Strategy Is Here, WAR
ON THE ROCKS (Sept. 20, 2018) https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/defending-forward-the-2018-cyberstrategy-is-here/; CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMM’N, Report (2020), https://www.solarium.gov/report; see
Perri Adams et.al., Responsible Cyber Offense, LAWFARE (Aug. 2, 2021, 11:22 AM); Michael Schmitt, Three
International Law Rules for Responding Effectively to Hostile Cyber Operations, JUST SEC. (July 13, 2021),
https://www.justsecurity.org/77402/three-international-law-rules-for-responding-effectively-to-hostilecyber-operations/.
199. See Open Skies Treaty, supra note 143; AMY F. WOOLF, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IN10502, THE
OPEN SKIES TREATY: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES (2021); Bonnie Jenkins, A Farewell to the Open Skies
Treaty,
and
an
Era
of
Imaginative
Thinking,
BROOKINGS
(June
16,
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/16/a-farewell-to-the-open-skies-treaty-andan-era-of-imaginative-thinking/. Note that the executive branch, without congressional participation, also
decommissioned the two aircraft that the United States had used for conducting Open Skies overflights,
so any subsequent effort to re-join the treaty would now be further impeded. 55TH WING PUB. AFFS.,
End of an Era as Final OC-135 Aircraft Officially Retired, OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE: NEWS (June 8, 2021),
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1987 Treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces.200 Under the prevailing
constitutional interpretation, the President claims a unilateral power to effectuate
such departures, without any congressional participation or vote.
--The United States has recently insisted on dramatically relaxing the
international standards that control the export of aerial drone technology. The
Missile Technology Control Regime is the loose, but quite effective, mechanism for
coordinating the national export systems of the leading high-technology weapons
suppliers. Because this regime is not legally binding, there is less opportunity for
Congress to engage, even though the degradation of the common export standards
can have long-term implications.201
--The most recent incident to highlight here is the September 2021 socalled “AUKUS” deal, through which the United States and the United Kingdom
agreed to sell nuclear submarines and missiles to Australia. The transaction roiled
relations with France, which had undertaken to supply Australia with alternative
weapons, and raised substantial concerns about undercutting global non-proliferation
standards. Reportedly, President Joe Biden was not fully informed about the deal
before it was concluded, and he later admitted that the entire transaction was
“clumsy.” Again, a revivified ACIS process might not have halted the sale – there
are important justifications militating in favor of expanded military cooperation in
the western Pacific. But it might have altered the arrangement’s proliferation-related
provisions, and it could have helped ensure that all the critical security variables were
taken fully into account in a timely, high-level manner.202

https://www.offutt.af.mil/News/Article/2650127/end-of-an-era-as-final-oc-135-aircraft-officiallyretired/.
200. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Dec. 8, 1987,
1657 U.N.T.S. 485; Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty on August 2, 2019, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE (Aug. 2, 2019), https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-withdrawal-from-the-inf-treaty-onaugust-2-2019/index.html; Shannon Bugos, U.S. Completes INF Treaty Withdrawal, ARMS CONTROL
TODAY, (Sept. 2019); AMY F. WOOLF, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11051, U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE
INF TREATY: WHAT’S NEXT?, (2020).
201. See, e.g., MTCR Guidelines, MISSILE TECH. CONTROL REGIME, https://mtcr.info/mtcrguidelines/; Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE:
BUREAU OF INT’L SEC. AND NONPROLIFERATION, https://www.state.gov/remarks-and-releases-bureauof-international-security-and-nonproliferation/missile-technology-control-regime-mtcr-frequently-asked
-questions/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2022); Kelsey Davenport, Missile Technology Control Regime at a Glance,
ARMS CONTROL ASSOC. (Mar. 2021), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mtcr; Mike Stone, U.S.
Relaxes Rules to Export More Aerial Drones, REUTERS (July 24, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-arms-trump/u-s-relaxes-rules-to-export-more-aerial-drones-idUSKCN24P2IC
(discussing
the
Trump Administration's decision to loosen restrictions on eligible governments to buy U.S. drones under
the Missile Technology Control Regime).
202. Shayan Karbassi, Legal Mechanisms of AUKUS Explained, LAWFARE (Sept. 24, 2021),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/legal-mechanisms-aukus-explained; George M. Moore & Frank N. Von
Hippel, Nuclear Subs in Australia Will Challenge the Nonproliferation Regime, THE HILL (Sept. 22, 2021),
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/573441-nuclear-subs-down-under-will-challenge-thenonproliferation-regime-and; James M. Acton, Why the AUKUS Submarine Deal Is Bad for Nonproliferation

312

Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law

Vol. 11:2

The bottom line in each of these miniature case studies, is that sometimes,
detailed examination of a proposal and its alternatives would do more than merely
provide ammunition to those who would automatically oppose the action. Instead,
it can generate a better, more well-reasoned, publicly debated governmental choice.

CONCLUSION
The fundamental goals motivating the establishment of the original ACIS
process remain in place – with even increased urgency – today. It is more valuable
than ever to ensure that national security decision-making in this richly complicated
era is imbued with diverse facts and rigorous scrutiny, fully reflecting the long-term,
wide-angle perspectives of arms control, non-proliferation, crisis stability, alliance
politics, and more. Equally critical is the value of accountability in ensuring that the
executive branch monopoly on information and analysis is shared in a timely fashion
with the Congress and the public, to help guard against myopia or bias.203
Skeptics may ask what impact can all this analysis really have? There can
be no magic solution here. If a President does not want to pursue arms control – if
the executive branch does not believe this perspective can help promote national
security and global stability – then no ACIS procedure could compel it to happen.
Conversely, if the President does want arms control, and does value it as a worthy
tool in support of diplomacy, then the ACIS apparatus is largely unnecessary – the
system will reliably advance that viewpoint independently.204
Most of the time, however, the situation will not be as stark as either of
those polar extremes, and the inner councils of the executive branch will incorporate
a wide range of beliefs, predictions, predilections, and awareness about arms control
and national security. In that situation, a practiced routine for rigorous, broad,
public, structured analysis of the nuanced alternative policies can play a useful role.205

– And What to Do About It, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE: COMMENT (Sept. 21, 2021),
https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/21/why-aukus-submarine-deal-is-bad-for-nonproliferation-andwhat-to-do-about-it-pub-85399; Ellen Mitchell, Kerry: Biden “Had Not Been Fully Aware” of Submarine
Deal’s Impact on France, THE HILL (Oct. 5, 2021, 2:06 PM); Biden: We Were Clumsy over France Submarine
Row, BBC NEWS: US & CAN. (Oct. 30, 2021) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-59085806.
203. The third goal of the original ACIS, to enhance the bureaucratic heft of ACDA, has been
rendered moot by that agency’s demise. 1979 Hearings, supra note 30. But see Blechman & Nolan, supra
note 36, at 1168-69 (arguing that the ACIS process actually diminished ACDA’s bureaucratic standing,
because it cast the agency as a stereotypical opponent of all weapons, serving congressional interests rather
than those of the administration, and leading other agencies to cut ACDA out of internal deliberations).
204. Gray, supra note 7, at 223, 232 (suggesting that an ACIS process is unnecessary if the national
leadership wants to pursue arms control, and is insufficient if the leadership is opposed).
Environmentalism, too, experiences oscillations with national politics. See Mandelker, supra note 49, §
2:17 (noting widely different success rates in NEPA cases litigated before judges appointed by Republican
and Democratic presidents).
205. In the same way, if there are vigorous proponents (or opponents) of arms control in the
Congress, then enhanced access to information and analysis, via a new ACIS, can strengthen their hand,
too, in influencing national debates.
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The proposed new ACIS program recommended here is quite ambitious
and far-reaching. Many might prefer instead to confine the scope of such an
innovation, at least initially, to a more tightly focused ambit. For example, it would
be plausible for a re-enactment of the statute to retain only the original ACIS
mandate, to address solely the national weapons programs, eschewing coverage of
other actions such as treaty negotiations and withdrawals. Others might sharpen the
program even more narrowly, to address only a program’s effects on nuclear nonproliferation, to zoom in on a topic of greatest current concern.206 Likewise, it might
be possible to mandate a cap on the number of ACIS statements to be prepared per
cycle, with negotiation among executive and legislative branch officials to identify
annually the twenty to fifty programs most deserving of specialized study and
reporting in the coming year.207
The perspective here, however, is that the original ACIS program received
such a harsh black eye, and is today held in such low esteem, that any proposed reestablishment faces strong push-back. Accordingly, it is appropriate to aim high,
with the most aggressive version of the proposal before it (inevitably) gets whittled
away by the political process.
Some of the spirit animating the enhanced interest in reviving ACIS in
2022 springs from fresh appreciation of the difficulty in trying to anticipate the farflung arms control implications of today’s weapons decisions. A salient illustration
of this problem derives from Henry Kissinger’s famous comment at a press
backgrounder in 1974. There Kissinger was reflecting upon the prior U.S. decision
to develop and deploy MIRV (Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle) weapons
during the SALT I negotiations and upon how the subsequent pursuit of those
weapons by the U.S.S.R. had complicated the global security situation and
jeopardized the negotiation of a follow-on treaty. He commented, "I would say in
retrospect that I wish I had thought through the implications of a MIRVed world
more thoughtfully in 1969 and 1970 than I did."208 In like manner, the executive
branch, the Congress, and the public should also all think through more thoughtfully
the implications of modern weapons and policy choices in a timely, expert fashion,
and should use an enhanced ACIS process to equip themselves to do so.
A revived ACIS process today, like the fifty years of EIS process, will not
provide a panacea, resolving all decisional problems in an efficient, cost-free fashion.
Arms control, like environmentalism, should not “win” all public policy contests –

206. The author is indebted to James E. Goodby for this suggestion. As the original ACIS
legislation was evolving, the Senate version of the bill would have confined its applicability only to nuclear
arms. Clarke, supra note 3, at 192.
207. Letter from Charles R. Gellner, in CRS 1977 Analysis, supra note 12, at 1, 5 (contemplating
that annual preparation of perhaps fifty ACIS documents per year might enable the executive branch and
the Congress to concentrate on the most important programs without becoming overwhelmed).
208. Fred Kaplan, We're About to Launch a Costly And Crazy Arms Race in Space, WASH. POST,
(Oct. 16, 1983); see also Gray, supra note 7, at 218 (suggesting that an ACIS process could have enabled
the United States to avoid the problems that MIRV has created for ICBM vulnerability).
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there are times when other social values and commitments should properly take
priority. But because of NEPA, environmentalism is always at the table; it cannot
be blithely disregarded. Arms control, in like fashion, should be formally and vividly
present in all national security decision making councils. A new ACIS process – unrepealing the 1994 abolition of the original mandate – could help make that happen.

